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&(X.ORD AND SATISFACTION.
1. A judgment., or any matter of record like a specialty, cannct be dis-
charged even by what would be considered a good accord and satisfaction
In other cases. Garvey v. Jrarvti, 124.
2. Where a creditor actually accepts fifty per cent. of his claim in full
satisfaction, it is a good accord and satisfaction. tagg v. -Alezander. 383.
ACKWOWLEDGMENT.
1. The right of an officer to take an acknowledgment does not depend
upon the length of his acquaintance with the person, nor upon the manner
in which his knowledge is acquired. Wood etat. v. Bach et a., 123.
ACTION. See RAILROAD, 16; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 16.
1. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits, the law compels all claims aris-
ing out of the same contract, and due at the time of bringing suit, to be
included in one action. Reforied Church v. Brown, 190.
2. Where one has unlawfully taken possession of another's property, the
tort may be waived, and an action brought for its value. Such a cause of
action Is assignable'. Harmet et at. v. Thorn, 1IM
3. An action of tort can be maintained against a person or his personal
representatives, for deceit in making false representations as to the
solvency of a mercantile firm of which he was a member. Morgan v.
Skidmore, 281.
4. No action can be brought on a contract against public policy, whether
it is executor or executed Martin v. Made, 319.
5. Arising from a want of care or skill of a physician does not survive
against his executor. Vittum v. Gilman, 516.
6. May be sustained against a justice of the peace for negligence in enter-
iug a judgment. Christopher v. Van Liew, 716.
7. Will lie on promise by justice of the peace to pay all damages growlu
out of his mistake in entering the judgment. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS,
1789,--- See ADMIRALTY, 1.
1789, - - See COURTS, 4.
1833, March 2. See INTERNAL REVENUE, 4.
1842, August 23. See OFFIcE AND OFFIcFR
1845, February-. See SHIPPING, 5.
1848, February 22. See COURTS, 11.
1850, July 29. See SHIPPING, 6.
1861, July 13. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 1.
1862, February 25. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAwl, &
1862, March 19. See PARTNERSHIP, 20.
186", July 17. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 18.
1863, - -- See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1863, March 12. See CONFEDERATE STATES, Is.
183, March 3 See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
1864, July 2. See CONVEDERATE STATES, 3.
1864, June 20. See MILITARY SERVIcE, 2.
1864, July 2. See WITNESS, 1.
186, March 5. See PRACTICE, &
1866, July 13. See INTERNAL REVNjE, 4.
1866 --- See TAXATION, 19.
1867, March 2. See BANKRUPTCY.
16S, February 10. See BA , 4.
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ADMINISTRATOR. See Exxcuron
ADMIRALTY. See CONSTITuTIoNAL LAW, 2.
1. The District Courts of the United States, upon whom the admiralty
jurisdiction was exclusively conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789, can
take cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the lakes
and waters connecting them, the same as upon the high seas, bays, and
rivers navigable from the sea. The Eagle, 55.
2. An execution against the owners of a boat and against the boat
also, is not such a proceeding to enforce a maritime lien against the boat,
as would give the District Court exclusive jurisdiction. 3erritt v. M2a--
gan, 635.
3. Suit was brought against a vessel by name, and the vessel attached
under the water craft laws of Mississippi, for a debt due plaintiff. Plaintiff
made affidavit that defendantwas a steamerin the navigable waters of the
State, and in his declaration set forth that he was a citizen of Mississippi
and that the 'home port" of the vessel was in that State: Held, that the
court had no jurisdiction, the cause being one of 9dmiralty. Deever v
Steamer Hope, 683.
4. When the proceeding is against a vessel by name, whatever may be
the nature of the claim, it is a proceeding in the nature and with all the
incidents of a suit in admiralty; and all such proceedings are, exclusively,
within the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States: Ferran
v. Lowndes, 190.
5. Our admiralty has jurisdiction to enforce a lien existing by the man.
time law of foreign nations. The Mfaggie Hammond, 440.
6. Whether the admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit in rem for a general
average loss--quar re? Oologaardt v. .Brig Anna, 473.
7. Seventeen miles an hour too high a rate of speed fora steamer moving
among vessels having tows. The Syracuse, 507.
8. If a steam vessel having another on her starboard does not keep out
of the way, she must show sufficient cause to justify such departure. T&
Corsica, 507.
9. Where the District and Circuit Courts concur in their view of an ad-
miralty case, every presumption will be in favor of their correctness, on
an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Quickstep, 508.
10. An objection of a too general allegation of injury should be made in
the court below. Id.
IL Nautical rules requirethe highestdiligenceon the part of a steamship
approaching in an opposite direction to a sailing vessel. The Carroll,
118.
12. Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment of collision
does not absolve a steamship which has previously been guilty of care-
lessness. I.
13. Justice and sound policy require that government property saved
from destruction, should bear its shareof the burden imposedbymaritime
law on other property in the same condition. The Davis, 774.
14. The possession necessary to maintain a suit in rem against property
must beactual. Id.
15 The possession by the captain of a merchant vessel of cotton loaded
by a treasury agent of the United States, is not the possession of the gov-
ernment. Id.
16. A libel for salvage may be filed in the name of the master and owners
of salving vessel, though master disclaim. The .Blackwell, 774.
17. A tug with, fire engiues, commonly used on land, on board, extin-
guishing a vessel on tire, is entitled to salvage. Id.
18. A vessel owned by a corporation is entitled to salvage. Tid.
19. Non-prosecution of their claim by one set of salvors anuses to the
beeflit of the vessel saved, and not the other set of salvors who prosecute.
Id.
AGENT. See ATTAcmHmnT, 1.
L A General Agency for a Life Insurance Company is like any other
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agency, revocable at the will of either party, subject to the ciaim of the
other party for such damages as the contract may entitle him to. Myers
v. Knickerboeker .Life Ins. Co., 82.
2. Where the contract of appointment does not give the agent an ezceu.
sive right to represent the company, the latter may appoint other agents,
but the appointment of another agent in the same place, whose operations
materially lessen the advantages of the contract to the first agent, is a
breach of the contract by the company, and the agent may terminate it,
or have an action for damages. .d.
3. The abandonment by the agent of a substantial part of his principal's
business, is a good ground of terminating his agency, but if the principal
assents to such abandonment, the authority of the agent as to the rest of
the business continues. Ad.
4. An insurance agent, by his contract, was to solicit new insurances,
and to collect premiums on renewals of former ones. On the new ones,
and on the renewals so long as they should be collected by him, and paid
to the company without other expense to it, he was to have certain specl.
fled coinmissions. Held, that his abandonment of soliciting new insur-
ances would be good ground for the company to terminate his agency fox
both purposes; but if the company failed to discharge him for such cause,
and he continued with its assent to collect the renewal premiums, then
his right to commissions thereon continued; and if the company subse-
quently refused, without other good cause, to allow him to collect renew-
als, he would be entitled to damages. Id.
5. Where one employed to sell property for another receives securities
for the purchase-money, and transmits them to his principal, his implied
authority to receive payment on the securities ceases with his possession.
Strachan v. Muxlow, 259.
6. Where the vice-president of a railway company bad been for years
in the habit of appointing local agents to look after its timber lands, and
these had sold timber, on one of which contracts of sale the company had
brought suit, a jury would be authorized to find that the company knew
and acquiesced in the authority thus exercised, and was bound by such a
contract of sale. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. rames, 259.
7. Knowledge of the agent is not notice, either actual or constructive,
to his principal. Brown v. Bankers & Brokers' Telegraph Co., 315.
8. If a creditor of a principal settles with his agent, and takes a note
for the debt, giving a receipt therefor as for actual payment, the debt as
to the principal will be discharged. Id.
9. Evidence of an agent having acted as such in similar transactions
with different persons isadmissible. Miorehead v. Hurray, 445.
10. An agency is revoked by war. Howell v. Gordon, 516.
11. Where a sub-agent is employed by an agent, the principal may
treat him as his agent. Miller v. P. & M. Bank, 575.
12. Where the representations made by an agent to obtain subscriptions
,ire a part of a scheme of fraud, participated in by the officers authorized
to transact the business of a corporation, or where they are such as the
3ubscriber may reasonably presume the corporation to have authorized,
they are admissible to prove the fraud by means of which the subscription
was procured. Castar v. Gas & Mater Co., 746.
13. Where such representations are contrary to the interests and duty
of the corporation, as, that he will release, or has authority to release, the
subsoription,it is not a reasonable presumption that he has suchauthority
and a subscriber on such terms would be particeps criminis, and held to all
the responsibilities of a bona fide subscriber. id.
14. But where, for the purpose of proving fraud, the offer was to show.
by a previous subscriber for six shares, that he was induced by the presi.
dent to change his subscriptions to twenty-sixshares on receiving fromthe
president a release, in writing, from the payment of twenty shares, it was
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AGENT
construed to be offered to show a release from the company, and the
court below erred in rejecting It. Id.
15. Five per cent. per month on the subscription, payable after falo.re
for thirty days to pay the call, though denominated interest, is notmerely
interest in the ordinary sense of the term, but is obviously a penalty to
enforce payment, and it is agreeable to the act that payment be enforced,
either by forfeiture of the stock itsef, or by a penalty of lve per cent
per month for delay. Id.
AGREEMENT. See CoNTAcT, 1; OEiicz ABD Omcri, 1, S.
1. If, with a full knowledge of the facts, a person ratify an agreement
which another party has improperly made for him, he makes himself a
party to it, as much as if the original agreement had been made with
him. Gregg v. Drakely 19-2.
2. Courts should give effect to an agreement for the adjustment of a
controversy, unless the case shows bad faith on the part of one of the
parties. Doyle v. Donnelly, 192.
AMENDMENT.
The allowance of an amendment to a petition, increasing the amount of
damages claimed, was held not erroneous. McDonad e uz. v. The Chi-
cago & N. W. B. Co., lO.
ARBITRATION. See LixITATIOHs, 8.
L The burden is upon the party objecting to a report of referees to
establish the facts upon which he relies. Rawson v.ahll, 191.
2. A submission to arbitration without an award will not operate as a
discontinuance. Dinsmrore v. Bnon, 08.
ARMY. See MmTuny SERvici.
ASSIGNMENT.
1. A bill of exchange, drawn by a creditor on his debtor, and nego-
tiated, does not of itself operate as an assignment in equity of the debt.
Bank of Cbmmerce v. Bogy, 193.
2. Anything that shows an intention on the one side to make a present
irrevocable transfer of the debt, and from which an assent to receive it
may be inferred on the other, will operate in equity as an assignment, if
supported by a sufficient e-nnsideration. Id.
ASS UMPSIT.
1. In an action to recover back money paid under a mistake of fact, it
is no defense that the plaintiff had within his reach the means of ascer-
taining the truth, or that he omitted to use vigilance and care by which
the mistake would have been avoided. .Ringston Bank v. Ettinge, 55.
2. Nor is it any defense to such an action, that the defendant cannot
be restored to his original position upon paying back the money. Id.
8. Where there has been a special contract, a recovery on a quantum
meruit cannot be at a higher rate than that stipulated in the contract.
Bishop v. -rke, 119.
4. The government is not liable on an implied assumpsit for the torts
of its officers. Gibbons v. Unted States, 199.
ATTACHMENT.
1. Funds of principal, deposited by the agent in bank, are not liable to
attachment for debt of agent, unless it I- shown that part belongs to such
agent. Bank v. Jaggers, 578.
2. Goods obtained on fraudulent representations may be reclaimed by
the vendor, even after attachmentby creditors of vendee. Reldv. Btearn,
578.
8. An officer attaching a store of goods is liable in damages for an un-
necessary ex lulslon and continued exclusion of the owner. Perryv. Cur,
exe
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ATTORNEY.
L An attorney, who, by agreement with his client, is to receive a por-
tion of the amount recovered, is not a necessary party plaintiff. McfDon.
ald v. 9. & W. ., 10.
2. In Wisconsin no attorney can be a surety. Cothren v. Connaughten,
.19.
3. Courts do not take judicial notice of who are practicing attorneys. Id.
4. Where plafntiff's attorney is to be paid out of the proceeds of a judg-
ment by agreement with his client, a settlement by the parties to the suit
will not be held fraudulent, in the absence of proof of a fraudulent intent
on the part of defendant. Cburlney v. McGavoc¢, 119.
5. Has no lien for his services before judgment, where the action Is for
unliquidated damages. Id.
6. The rule prohibiting a justice from practicing as attorney or coun-
selor, does not extend to a case where the justice is interested in the sub-
ject-matter. Libby v. Rosekrans, 260.
7. A court has power outside of the common law doctrine of contempt,
to disbar an attorney for acts calculated and intended to injure the court.
.z parte iggs, 574.
8. A court will not interfere by summary proceedings with an attorney
who is settling the costs, unless it appears that he is acting fraudulently
Barker's case, 711.
AUCTION. See ExEcuToRs AND ADMIISTRATOas, 4.
1. The sum stipulated at auction as forfeited, if the purchaser does not
comply with his contract, cannot be recovered at law or equity. Bullock
v. Adars Ex'r, 383.
2. The employment of puffers is a fraud upon honest bidders at auction.
Nat. Bk. of the Metropolis v. Sprague, 383.
3. It is illegal for persons intending to purchase a't auction to combine
not to bid against each other. Id.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See ConuoN CARRmE, 1, 3; RAILROAD, 10,11.
BAIL. See CRIMINAL LAw, 13, 10.
BAILMENT.
A verbal promise to return a thing hired in good order, and at a speal.
fled time, does not import a contract of insurance against loss. ield v.
Bracket, 120.
BANK AND BANKER. See LIMITATIONS. 5; SURETY; TAXATION, 12,13.
1. Officers of savings institutions are to be held to the exercise of rca
sonable care and diligence. Sullivan v. Lewistown Ins. for Savings, 1-0.
2. Strict proof of the identity of a depositor is not required. Id.
3. The word "place," where the bank is located, used in the Acts of
Congress, in reference to the taxation of national banks, means the Stats
in which the bank is located. Saving Institution v. Boston, 272.
4. The Act of Congress of Feb. 10, 18M, which prescribes that the taxa-
tion of the shares in national banks "shall not be at a greater rate than
is assessed upon any other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens," is satisfied if the rate upon bank shares is the same as the rate
upon moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens in the town or
city where the bank Is located. Id.
5. Where the rate of taxation is the same for individual capital and
shares of non-resident owners of national bank stock, the fact that the
latter are taxed specifically, for the benefi of the State treasury, and the
former for local municipal purposes, does not make the tax invalid, as in
conflict with the Act of Congress. Id.
6. The law imposes upon a bank the obligation of knowing the signa-
ture of its depositors; and it cannot therefore recover for a forgery it has
failed to detect. Commercial Bank v. First NZat. Bank 316.
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7. Where neither the charter nor by-laws of a corporation fixes the term
of office of its cashier, but vests the appointment of all officers in the
"1 directors for the time being." a cashier so appointed holds his office during
the pleasure of the directors, unless they, at the time of appointment, lhiit
the duration of his office to a specified term. sparks v. l hrmers' Bank,
3W5.
8. Under such circumstances, a general resolution of a board of directors
that the cashier should be annually elected, and the practice of that and
subsequent boards, to hold elections annually, constituted him an annual
officer in a certain sense; but not so entirely as to make his term of
office expire ipso facto, at the end of the year, it is a question of what
term the board intended to elect for. And where the charter prescribed
that-the cashier, before entering on the duties of his office, should give
bond, etc., it will be presumed that the board intended the old cashier to
continue in office until thenew one shonldnot only be elected but qualified
to take his place. Id.
9. Therefore, where a cashier was elected, and gave bond in one year,
and was re-elected the next year, but failed to give a new bond, itwas held.
that he was in office by virtue of his first election, and his sureties were
liable for his acts dnring the second year. Id.
10. The fact that the bank neglected to have the cashier's bond renewed
on his re-election, whereby the bond of the original sureties remained in
force after the period they had been led to expect, does not estop the bank
from proceeding on the bond; it not appearing that the expectation as to
the time their bond was to be in force was due to representations by the
bank. Id.
11. Nor is the bank estopped by its failure to examine the cashier's
accounts with such frequency as to discover his defalcations within the
year in which they took place. The bank owed the sureties good faith,
not diligence. Id.
12. Receiving a note for collection, has a right to retain the proceeds, as
against the true owner, on account of a balance due from the transmitter.
Dickerson v. Wason, 191.
13. Has a lien on all securities In his hands for money advanced to a
customer. Lcdter v. F. & H- Bank, 575.
BANKRUPTCY. See CouRTs, 15.
1. Jurisdiction.
1. The Bankrupt Act does not authorize the courts of bankruptcy to
enjoin a State court even in the matter of the distribution of the assets or
an insolventpartnership, nor does it declare themtheonly courts in which
such distribution can be made. Clark v. Bininger, 30L
2. The Bankrupt Act gives the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in
all matters in Bankruptcy. Van -Nostrand v. Carr, 317.
3. The jurisdiction is independent of the right of the party ultimately
to obtain his discharge. XId.
4. The Federal Bankrupt law suspended the operation of the statutes of
California, for the relief of insolvent debtors. Martin v. Berry 317.
5 The Federal Bankrupt law went into effect on the first of June, 1867,
in California. Id.
6. In an indictment under section 44 of the Bankrupt Act, for fraudu-
lently obtaining goods on credit the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court
must be pleaded and proved with such particularity as to show affirma-
tively that an adjudication of bankruptcy was made upon a case in which
the court had jurisdiction. United States v. Prescott d al., 481.
7. The indictment therefore should set out the filing of the petition, the
name of the petitioning creditor, the amount of his debt, the allegdA act
of bankruptcy and the adjudication of the Bankrupt Court. ld.
S. The description of the goods obtained must be as certain ap t can
reasonably be made. It should be as definite as would be requirsul in a
declaration in trover. Id.
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BANKRUPTCY.
9. Offenses under Section 44 are misdemeanors, and the word "felo-
niously" should not be used. Id.
IL Adts of .Bankruptcy.
10. An application of a party for the benefit of the Insolvent Laws of
Maryland, is an act of bankruptcy. Van Nostrand v. Carr, 317.
Mii. .Lffects of the .Tnstitution of Pr'oceedings.
1L Where the jurisdiction of a State court has attached, as e. g. in a bill
for an account between partners, and property has passed into the hands
ofa receiver under its orders, the jurisdiction is not disturbed by a subse.
quent adjudication ot bankruptcy of the parties, and the title of the
receiver is superior to that of the assignee in bankruptcy. Clark v. Bin.
inger, 04.
12. A judge in the Supreme Court has no power by rule in vacation to
compel an assignee to turn over property, levied on by a sheriff. Ri v.
2leming, 50&
13. The sheriff's remedy is by action of trover, or by proceeding in
Bankrupt Court. Id.
14. Adjudication of bankruptcy is no excuse for a sheriff not selling
property levied on, and not brought into the Bankrupt Court for distri.
bution. Sharman v. Howell, 509.
IV. Practice.
15. Courts of bankruptcy will recognize and give effect to all liens
whether national or State, according to theirpriority of date, except strict
maritime liens, which take precedence in accordance with their character
Matter of Dwight Scot, 349.
V. Discharge.
16. The discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy, after breach of an in.
solvent bond, is no defense to the sureties on the bond. Czaflin v. Cogan,
512.
VI. Rights and Duties of Assignee. See ante, 12.
17. May be substituted as appellant in the Supreme Court, where the
assignor becomes bankrupt after appeal taken. Herndon v. Howard, 576.
18. The landlord in Virginia has a lien on property of the tenant, being
and remaining upon the demised premises, for one year's rent accrued and
to accrue, in preference to any mortgage, deed of trust, or judgment; .'mi
this lien is to be satisfied by the assignee in preference to such other lien.
as well as in preference to the claims of general creditors. Matter of Wrnne
Bankrupt, 627.
19. Process to enforce the judgment of one State in another Is mesne
process, within the meaning of the 14th section of Bankrupt Act of 1661.
vesting the property of bankrupt in the assignee. Randell & Co. v. Mc-
Clain, Assignee, 636.
VIL Distribution.
20. Debts secured by a deed of trust, made without fraud and without
violation of any provision of the Bankrupt Act, are to be preferred in
payment to the claims of general creditors in the distribution of the pro-
ceeds of the bankrupt estate by the assignee In bankruptcy. Matter of
Wynne, Bankrupt, 627.
21. &nmbLe. that, though under the statute of the State, a deed of trust
takes effect as to creditors only from and after the recording thereof, such
a deed will take effect from that time, though such recording be after the
passage of the Bankrupt Act, if it be before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. Id.
BILL OF LADING. See SmPPnG,l.
While a bill of lading, in so far as it is a contract, cannot be explained
by parol, yet being a receipt it may, in a suit between the original parties.
The Lady Franklin, 19L
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BILLS AND NOTES. See AsSIGNrMNT, 1; CONFEDERATE STATES, 4; Ezzmeron
AND ADMrxisTRATOR, 2; LIxITATIoNs, 1.
1. Where a note made by one member of a joint stock association, and
endorsed by another, for the purpose of raising money for the use of the
association, is paid and taken up by a third, the latter cannot maintain
an action against the memberand first indorser torecoverback the money
advanced by him, until an account has been taken between the parties.
C ater v. .Bininger, 124.
2. That the articles were not in the condition represented at the time
of purchase, is a good defense to a suit on note given for the price. More-
head v. Murray, 445.
8. Evidence that, by the articles of partnership, one partner has no
right to endorse negotiable paper, is inadmissible to defeat a bona fide
holder. Michigan v. Eldred, 509.
4. A partnership indorsing negotiable paper, having blanks left for the
date, and giving the same to a person for use, is liable on the paper with
the date filled in. Id.
5. An endorsement by the payee of a note, without qualification, im-
ports property in the holder, and a third party may treat him as bona fide
owner without inquiry. -dler v. -. MBqnk, 575.
6. When one in the course of business entrusts another with the form
of a bill, check, or note, duly signed or endorsed by himself, but in blank
as to any or all of the material parts, of date, amount, time or place of
payment, or name of payee, the law will presume that he authorizes that
other to fill up the blanks consistently with the tenor and effect of th"
form. Spier v. James, W5.
7. If he limits the authority by special instructions, and his instructions
are disregarded, and the paperis completed in a manner not contemplated
by him, he will not be answerable to the wrong-doer on the terms of the
instrument, nor to any one taking the same with notice of the wrong; but
he will be held liable to a bona fide purchaser. Id.
8. A bona fide purchaser is one who, for full value, obtains from the
apparent owner a transfer of negotiable paper before it matures, and who
has no notice of any equities between the original parties, or of any defect
in the title of the presumptive owner. Id.
9. Whatever assignment of a note a payee may make, he may bring an
action on it in his own name while it is in his own hands. -ichards v.
Darst, 71L
BOND. See BANKRUPTCY, 16; CONFEDERATE STATzs, 6; S9ERixF, 3, 4; SLAVE, 1, 2.
I1ROKER.
1. Where a broker buys stock for a customer under an agreement to
pay for it and carry it, the customer to furnish and keep up a specified
margin on the market value, the broker holds the stock as a pledge for
his advances and commissions, and though the customer fails to keep up
his margin after notice and demand, yet the broker cannot sell the stock
without giving reasonable notice to the customer of the time and place of
sale. Markham v. audon, 285.
2. In an action for damages for the conversion of the stock by sale under
such circumstances, evidence of the custom of brokers is not admissible
to show the rights of the parties or to explain the words "carry" arid
-margin." Id.
3 In such action the measure of damages is the highest value of the
stock between the time of the sale and the time of trial. Id.
4. Sterling v. .audon, 48 Barb. 459. and Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb., 186,
overruled. Id.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &o.
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419, commented on. Woodruff v.
a trharin 25.
eooper v. Nashville. 6 Wall. 247, approved. Clark V. Dick, 739.
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CAHES APPROVED. OVERRULED, etc.
Davidson v. Manlove, 2 Cold. 347. overruled. Smith v. Brazellon, 762.
Eshbach v. Eshbach, 11 Harris, 343, commented on. Angier v. Angier.
855.
Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, commented on. Porter v. CromweU, 60.
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 53"2, approved. 2%e Protector, 516.
Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186, overruled. Markham v. Taudon, 286.
Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, affirmed. Hornthall v. Cbllector,
451.
McDermald v. Russell, 41 Ills. 489, explained Dyer v. L'ast, 714.
Meyers v. Ladd, 26 Ills. 415. approved. Hutton v.A.rnetU, 775
Murdock v Gifford, 18 N Y. 28, commented on. _1orter v. Cromwell, 60
Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166,'affirmed. Supervtors v. Durant, 448.
State v. Joyce 19 WIs. 90, overruled. Hansom v. Taylor. 195.
Sterling v. Jaudon, 48 Barb. 459, overruled. Markham v. r'audon, 2M6
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio, M. S. 511, approved. Parter v. Cromwell, 60.
The Camanche, 8 Wall. 476, affirmed. The Blackwall, 774.
The Ourchita, 6 WalL 521, affirmed. McKee v. United States. 56.
Wait v. Green, 36 N. Y. 556. distinguished. Burt v. Dewey, 62.
Wood v. Stone 2 Cold. 370, overruled. Smith v. Brazelton, 762.
Wright v. Overall, 2 Cold. 336. overruled. Smith v. Brazelton, 762.
Yost v. Stout, 4 Cold. 205, overruled. Smith v. Brazeon, 76-2.
CERTIORARI. See Co RTs, 2,6.
Will only lie to review the judicial proceedings of a county court
Matter of Saline Co. Subscriptions, 318.
CHECK. See PAymT, 1,
CHURCH. See COUnTS, 18.
1. By invoking it church litigants acknowledge the jurisdiction of the
civil power of the State. Garten v. Pennick 210.
2. A church, like every other organized body of citizens, must be con-
solidated by an organic law, and under and according to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Td.
3. The organic law of the Presbyterian Church is a fundamental com-
pact, voluntarily made between all the members of the unincorporated
association, for the guidance and protection of each constituent church
and member, and necessarily inviolable, by any delegated power of the
aggregate church. Id.
4. The Presbyterian Church is certainly as much bound as Congress by
the Federal Constitution, and allits members are subordinate to that and
the State constitutions, which are supreme overall citizens in every con-
dition. rd.
5. So far as civil rights and duties are concerned, the civil government
has supreme authority to rule; and to that extent every citizen of every
grade and condition owesa paramount allegiance totatsovereigntyand
Is reciprocally entitled to its protection over all other human power. Id.
6. Civil tribunals have jurisdiction over controverted claims to the use
of church property both in England and in this country. Id.
7. Whilethegeneral desire of courts of laws is to avoid ecclesiastical or
spiritual questions, they find it impossible wholly to do so. If abody of
men have wrongful possession ofa church or ofa sum of money on the
pretense, for example. thatthey are the religiousbody to which the ioney
or building was destined, their opponents have no way of redressing
the wrong and vindicating their own rights, except by appealing to the
civil tribunals of the country; and civil tribunals have no mens of doing
justice, except by investigatinginto the differences of doctrine, discipline
or practice,which, to the litigants, may be religious differences, but to the
judge are mere matters of fact bearing on a question of civil right. Id.
CITIZEN. See CouronATION, 1, 3; MAwAMus,.2.
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COMMON CARRIER. See DAMAGzS, 2.
1. A common carrier may make reasonable regulations as to the place
where the baggage of passenger shall be deposited, and if actual notice
of the regulation is given to him, or it be shown that the regulation
had become, by general usage so notorious and universal that he must
bepresumed to have known it, the passenger violating It cannot recover
for loss of his baggage. Macin v. Steamboat, 239.
2. Posting a printed copy of the regulation in carrier's conveyance or
ofice, does not amount to notice to the passenger. He is under no legal
obligation to read such notices. Id.
8. A passenger on a steamboat who carries his valise with him to his
state room, does not thereby undertake the exclusive care of it, so as to
release the carrier from all liability to it. Id.
4. The placing of his valise in his state-room by a passenger who has
paid his tare and received the key of the room, is a sufficient delivery
to the carrier to charge him for negligence. Id.
5. A regulation that would prevent a passbnger, who was to spend the
night on a boat, from takingto his state-room the baggage necessary for
his toilet and for his daily use, would not be reasonable or valid. Id.
6. It is the duty of a carrier of grain in bulk, to see that his barge is
always sufficiently strong to resist all ordinary applications of external
force. The Northern Belle, 442.
7. Cannot contract against liability for loss from his own ordinary neg-
ligence. I. P. and C .RB. v. Allen, 442.
8. In assumpit againsta common carrier, proof of delivery of a smaller
quantity of material than that alleged, is no variance. Denning v Grand
Trunk B B ., 509.
9. Where there was a contract to carry freight a particular time,
proof that its transportation was prevented by an unexpected rush of
freight, is inadmissible. Id.
10. Cannot dispute the title of a person delivering the goods for ship-
ment. Wallace v. Matthews, 510.
11. Where the owner of goods delivers them to a carrier for transpor-
tation through a number of separate but connecting lines, it is the gen-
eral custom for each carrier to pay back charges for freight, and the last
carrier has alien on the goods for the whole. &hneider v. Evans, 536.
12. The first carrier guaranteed that the whole freight should not ex.
ceed a stipulated sum. The second carrier paid the charges of the first in
ful, and at the end of the rbute a lien was claimed for the whole freight
though it exceeded theguaranteed amount: Held, that though the ship.
per would be entitled to recover back the excess from the first carrier,
yet the second carrierhaving paid the chargein the usual course of busi.
ness and in ignorance of the guaranty, acquired a valid liet for the
amount paid, and such lien passed to the subsequent carriers. Id.
13. Destruction of whisky by a provost-marshal, under the authority
of the Confederate States, in186-2, cannot be claimed as the act of a public
enemy by a railroad company situated within the limits of that govern-
menu, and recognizing its control. APatterson v. N. . B. B. C., 581.
CONFEDERATE STATES See ExzcuroR, 8.
L The military authorities of the United States had no power, under
the Act of July 13,1861, to license commercial intercourse between the
seceding States and the rest of the United States. Mcee v. The United
tates, 56.
2. Nor was such trade authorized in March 1864, by regulations pre
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance of said act. Id.
& The Act of July 2,1864, did not confer the power on the Secretary of
the Treasury to license trading within the lines of the enemy. United
States v. Lane, 121.
4. The presumption is, that a note given for articles purchased at an
administrator's sale in March, 1864, is payable in Confederate currency.
Laws v. Ilycro/i, M8.
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5. Proof that at a sale proclamatlonwas made, that, "1 Confederate notes
will not be taken," rebuts the presumption made by the ordinance of 185.
Cherry v. Savage, 384.
6. The term "1in good money after the war" in a bond, maybe proved to *
mean "in money good after the war." Lowers v. Barnhart, 38.
7. When the insurgent government of Virginia was dispersed by the
superior force of the United States, the civil authorities did notnecessarily
cease at once to exist. Woodson v. Peck, 435.
& They continued in being defacto, charged with the duty of mantaining
order until superseded by the regular government. Id.
9. Thus the Common Council 6f Harrisonburg, thoughelected under the
insurgent government, remained charged with thegovernment of the town
notwithstanding the temporary occupation of the place by the United
States forces. d.
10. It might have been superseded, for the government of the United
States was not bound to recognize any authority which originated with the
rebel government; but it was not superseded. d.
11. The Mayorand Common Council, therefore, exereisingtheir authority
derived from their election, and not by virtue of a military order, have
no right to remove a suit from the State to a Federal court, when that suit
has been brorght for an alleged false imprisonment and malicious prosecu-
tion thereon, charged to have been committed by them in the discharge of
their municipal functions. Id.
12. A prosecution for treason in a so-called "court of the Confederate
States" for aiding the United States troops, is a nullity. Blickman- v. nes,
443.
13. Claimants under the act of March 12,1S63, are not deprived of the ben.
efits of the act because of aid not voluntarily given to the rebellion. United
States v. .Padelford, 443.
14. Voluntarily becoming surety on the bond of a quartermaster in the
rebel army, is giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. d.
15. In ordinary dealing during the war, without design to aid the rebel.
Hon, Confederate treasury notes were a sufficient consideration to sup-
port a contract. -1ingsbury v. Lyon 443.
16. The distinction between such acts of the State authorities during the
recent war, as are valid and such as are not, depends upon whether they
were intended to obstruct the policy of the United States in regard to
the rebellion, or not. Leak v Commfssioners of Richmond, 441.
17. A depositor of the money of the United States or a public debtor, can-
not defend against a suit on his official bond by proving that he paid the
money due the United States to one of its creditors, under an order of the
Confederate authoritieswhere heshowsno force orphysical coercion which
compelled obedience to such order United SWes v. AKeeheCr, 510.
18. The seizure of property is essextlal to give jurisdiction to the court
to decree a forfeiture under the Act of July 17, 1862. Pelham v. Bose,
515.
19. Executors are not responsible for loss from investment of funds in
Confederate certificates and treasury notes, where next of kin does not ob-
ject. Cbbb v. Taylor, 576.
20. A contract, the consideration of which was carrying the mail of the
Confederate States, is against public policy and cannot be enforced. Clem-
moms v. Hampton, 50.
21. The State is not liable for property seized by officers of the Federal
army, until a provisional Governor has been appointed by the President.
Wallace v. Alford, 637.
CONLICT OF LAWS. See Dz=xriw's EsTAT 2.
In an action on a policy of Insurance dated in Portland, by a resident of
NewHampshire, it was held that the place of contract was Maine, and the
laws of that State must govern. Bailey v. Hope Ins. Cb., 122.
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1. Power of the Executive.
1. The war department by its proper officers, may make a valid contract
for the slaughtering, curing and packing of pork, when that is the most
expedient mode of securing supplies of that kind. U. S. v. Speed, 63.
IL Power of Legislature. See MANDAUS, 9.
2. State legislatures have no authority to create maritime liens or son.
ferjurisdiction on State courts to enforce such liens by proceedlngsinrem.
Such jurisdiction is exclusively in the Courts of Admiralty of the United
States. Deee v. Steamer Hope, 683.
3. The legislature has no power to compel a city to incur a debt against
its will. South Park Coms. v. Chicago, 718.
IIL Rights and Powers of the State. See post, 20, 22, 29.
4. Foreign goods sold by the shipper to a third person, while still on
board the ship, are not exempted from State taxation, under the clause of
the Constitution, saying, "no State shall lay any imposts on imports."
Waring v. The Mayor, 56.
5. A law changing the place of trial is not an ex post facto law. Gut v.
State, 511.
IV. Judicial Power.
6. Appellate jurisdiction in the Federal courts depends on the Constitu-
tion and the Acts of Congress. When these do not confer it. courts of the
United States cannot exercise it by virtue of agreement of counsel or other.
wise. The Lucy, 199.
7. So much of the Act of March 3,1863, as provides for the removal of a
judgment in a State court, where the cause was tried by a jury, for a re
trial, is unconstitutional. The Justices v. Murray, 444.
8. THe PowzR O THE JUDIOaRY To DEcLARE Aw AcT or CoNGaEss voia
FOR UNCONSTITUTIOlwALiTy, 585.
V. Power of Congress.
9. There is in the Constitution no express grant of legislative power to
make any description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of
debts. Hepburn v. Griswold, 175.
10. The words "all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu.
tion" powers expressly granted or vested, havein the Constitution, a sense
equivalent to that of the words, laws not absolutely necessary indeed, but
appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legtimate ends, which
are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Consti-
tution; laws really calculated to effect objects entrusted to the govern.
ment. Id.
11. Among the means appropriate, plainly adapted, not inconsistent
with the spirit of the Constitution, noprohibited by its terms, the legisla.
ture has unrestricted choice; but no power can be derived by implicatlon
from any express power to enact laws as a means for carrying it into exe-
cution, unless such laws come within this description. Id.
12. The making of notes or bills of credit a legal tender in payment of
pre-existing debts is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, or really
calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; is
inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and is prohibited by the
Constitution. Id.
13. The clause in the Acts of 1862 and 1863, which makes United States
notes a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, is, so far
as it applies to debts contracted before the passage of those acts, unwar.
ranted by the Constitution. Id.
14. Congress has no power to prevent State courts from taking juriadic.
tion of an action for the want of a stamp. Cbppernoll v. Ketcham, 51.
VI. Taking Private Property.
15. Under that clause in our Constitution which provides for the taking
of private property for public use, the use must be such as is public in its
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character, and not public merely because it is declared to be such. JEai
. Louis v. St. John, 56.
16. Private property cannot be taken by the State without the owner's
consent, for the pritwie use of another person, even if compensation be
made. Orton v. Hari, 122.
17. When individual property is condemned for public use and dama-
ges assessed therefor, the land cannot be occupied until damages are paid.
Soidh Park Corm. v. Williams, 71.
18. The means of making compensationto theownersof land condemned
for the Park, is provided by the Act of February, 1869, of Illinois. Id.
VII. Regulation of 6ommerce.
19. The provision of the National Constitution, that no State shall,
without the consent of Congress, levy any imposts or duties on imports
or exports, extends alone to articles brought into a State from a foreign
country, and has no application to articles brought from one State into
another; hence this provision does not prohibit a State from taxing arti-
cles brought into it for sale from a sister State, even though when taxed
they are in the original or unbroken package. Woodruff v. Parham, 25.
20. A State law authorizing a tax on all sales of merchandise, whether
the goods sold be the produce of that State orsome other, and not discrimi.
nating against the products of sister States or their cltizens, is valid, even
though the articles were sold at wholesale in the original and unbroken
2ackages. Id.
21. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, and other cases commented on
and distinguished from the present case by MILLz, J. Id.
22. The provision of the National Constitution against taxing imports
by the States, does not extend to articles brought from asister State; there-
fore this provision does not prohibit a State from taxing articles brought
into it for sale from another State, even though when taxed such property
is in the original package; but another provision of the Constitution, viz.:
the commercial clause, does prohibit a State from passing tax laws dis-
criminating adversely to the products of other States and in favor of its
own, and which can be seen to operate to fetter commerce among the
States. linson v. Lot, 36.
23. The principle of Woodruff v. Parham, ante p. 26, affirmed and
applied to a case where, although the mode of collecting the tax on the
article made in the State was different from the mode of collecting the tax
on the articles brought from another State into it, yet the amount paid was
in fact the same on the same article in whatever State made. Id.
24. A law of Virginia, compelling corporations chartered by other States
to give security and procure a license before doing business in Virginia, is
constitutional, not being in violation of the clause giving citizens of each
State the privileges of citizens of the several States, nor of th e clause giving
Congress power to regulate commerce. Paul v. Commonwealth of rir-
ginia, 109.
25. The issuing of a policy of insurance Is not a transaction of commerce,
even though the parties be domiciled in different States; it isasimple con-
tract of indemnity against loss. .d.
26. The act of 1868, cl. 413, provides, that "No person not being a per-
manent resident in this State shall sell, offer for sale, or expose for sale,
within the limits of the city of Baltimore, any goods, wares, or merchan-
dise whatever, other than agricultural products, and articles manufactured
in the State of Maryland, within the limits of the said city, either by card,
sample or other specimen, or by written or printed trade-list or catalogue,
w6ether such personbe the maker or manufacturer thereof or notwithout
first obtaining a license so to do." On an indictment against a party for
a violation of this law, Held:
27. L That said law is not repugnant to that clause of the 8th section of
the ist article of the Constitution of the United States, which grants to COD.
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gress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
2. 2 That it is not repugnant to that clause of the 2d section of the 4h
article of the Constitution, which declares, that "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States."
29. 3. That it is within the power of a State to tax, in the shape of a
license, and trade, business or occupation, when carried on in its borders
by those who are not permanent residents of the State, whether foreigners
or citizens of other States. Ward v. &tte of Maryland, 424.
30. The section of the Revenue Act relating to the sale of naphtha and
Illuminating oils, has no constitutional operation within State limits.
United States v. Dewitt, 451
CONTRACT. See AeEzzArzwr; COMMON CARERt, 9; CONFEDERATE STATES, 15,
20; COVENANT, 1; EQuiTY, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12; SPocrFic PzRroR-
MANcz, 4.
1. An agreement to give the refusal of certain land for thirty days in
consideration of $1 paid, is not a contract. Potts v. Whitehead. 31&
2. An offer in writing within a certain time to convey land, must be
accepted within the time fixed. Id.
& A contract, any material part of which remains to be settled by nego.
tiation between the parties, will not be enforced in equity on a bill for
specific performance. Id.
4. If A is indebted to B, and R to C, and by agreement A gives his note
to C, it is a novatlon and extinguishes A's indebtedness to B, and B's to
C. Dever v. .Aiken, 638.
5. If D holds a note of B and C as joint promissors, and in satisfaction
thereof A takes a note of B as principal and D as security, it is a novation.
GrWham v. Morrow, 638 -
COPYRIGHT.
A claim for arranging an elastic bed for printing designs, is not a claim
for a design under Act March 2,1861, section eleven, but a claim for a
device. Clark v. Bonsfield, 774.
COJRPORATION. See AGExt, 12; EQUITY, 2; ESTOPPEr, 2.
1. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States, though the courts of the United States, for the pur-
pose of sustaining jurisdiction, have conclusivelypresumed that a corpora.
tion chartered by a State is composed of citizens of that State. au v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 109.
2. The privileges intended by the provision of the Constitution, declar.
ing that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges of citi.
zensin the several States, are those which are common tothd citizens of the
several States, under their constitutions and laws, by virtue of their being
citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own State are not
secured in other States by it. Id.
3. The members of a corporation are legally presumed to be citizens of
the State by which it was created. Hrobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Cb., 127.
4. The consolidation of the stock of a railroad company created by the
laws of Wisconsin with that of one created by the laws of Illinois, does not
constitute the corporations thus consolidating one corporation of both
States or of either. Racine & M. 1.R. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Cto., 260.
'5. A mortgage made in the corporate name by the officers of the consoli.
dated company, upon the line of the railroad in Illinois, is the sole mort-
gage of the Illinois corporation. Id.
6. The members of a voluntary incorporated association are entitled, as
individuals having a common interest, to sue in regard to matters perrtin.
tug to, or affecting their interests. .ears and others v. Moulton, 3M8
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7. May be stricly private, although its object when accomplished may
be a pubio benefit. Harward v. St.Clair Drainage Co., 712.
COUPON. See LimTATiOwS, 12.
Suit maybe brought on coupons detached from the bend. 27w Cityv.
Lamson, 577.
COURTS. See EvrDExor, 12; INTERIrATIONAL L&w, 5, 6.
1. THE REMo VAL OF CAUSES FRO STATE TO FEDERAL CouRTs. L
2. The Circuit Court of the United States in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, may, by the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, examine the
decision of the same court acting in its original jurisdiction. Ez parte
Yerger, 57.
3. A question which is pending in one court of competent jurisdiction
cannot be raised and agitated in another by adding a new party and rais-
ing a new question, as to him, along with the old one, as to the former
party. Memphis Cb. v. Memphis, 57.
4. A cause can be removed from a State court into the Supreme Court of
the United States, whenever a question arising under the 25th section of
the Judiciary Act of 17M3 is relied on. Iirman v. ichol, 57.
5. Courts of the United States are not bound to give instructions upon
specific requests by counsel for them. Wills v. Smith, 59.
6. On a common law certiorari, the Supreme Court of New York is not
restricted to the inquiry, whether the court below exceeded its jurisdic-
tion. People ex ret. Martin v. Commissioners of Pilots, 12L
7. An unfounded assumption by the legislature, that a particular juris-
diction existed, is not sufficient to create it, unless provision is made for
its exercise. State v. .' tler, 124.
8. The record must show by express words, or legal Inteudment, t]ta
one of the questions under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act was deci-
ded by the State court to give the Supreme Courftjurisdictlon. Gibson v.
Ohouteau, 19.
9. In the Court of Claims the government is liable for refusing to receive
and pay for what it has agreed to purchase. Gibbons v. United States, 199.
10. The statute does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims of
losses incurred by individuals from the torts of officers of the govern-
ment. Id.
I. The Act of February 22d, 1848, transferring to the District Courts of
the United States, cases of a Federal character begun in territorial courts
of certain territories then admitted to the Union, is to be construed so as
to transfer the cases into the District Courts, if on admission the State did
not form part of a judicial circuit, but if it did, then into the Circuit Court.
ountz Bros. v. Express Co., 200.
12. In general, all courts of record, whether of special and inferior or of
generafjurisdiction, can modify or set aside entries of their own action
made during the term but that does not involve the right to refuse to en-
ter or set aside a lawful verdict. Id.
13. Courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction have no power tosetaside
the verdict of juries found in their courts and to grant new trials, in the
absence of authority by statue or long usage. Bartling v. Jamison. 206.
14. The power of the Circuit Court of the United States to issue a writ of
Prohibition to another court is confined to cases where the issuing of such
a writ is necessary for the exercise of its own jurisdiction. and is agree.
able to the principles and usage of law. United States v. 27&e Superior
Cburt. 297.
15. Where an adjudication of bankruptcy of a paitnership firm is made
by the District Court, and is brought into the Circuit Court for review
under Section 2 of the Bankrupt Act, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
is revisory only, and does not extend beyond a review of questions pre-
sented to the District Court. Any orders or proceedings to carry into
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execution the orders or decrees of the District Court, must be made by
that court. Id.
16. Therefore, a suit by one of the bankrupt partners against the other,
in a State court, seeking an account, and the appointment of a receiver, is
not such an interference with the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as
would autborize it to issue a writ of prohibition. Id.
17. Whether in any case the Circuit Court has power to issue a writ of
prohibition to a State court, dubitatur. Id.
18.' Pending an action relating to church property, the Louisville Chan.
cery Court put the church into the possession of the marshal and made a
decree, from which an appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decree and remitted the record, with a mandate to the chancery to
carry the opinion into effect. After this mandate had been filed in the
chancery, but before it had been entered of record or any final order to
carry it into effect had been made, suit was commenced in the United
States Circuit Court to obtain possession of the same church by other
members who had acquired a domicil in another State: Hreld,
19. 1. That the intent with which the domicil was acquired was imma.
terial.
20. 2. That the first suit was still pending in the Chancery when the bill
was filed in the Circuit Court, and, therefore, the latter court could not
acquire jurisdiction.
21. 3. That even if the suit in the Circuit Court involved new issues be-
tween new paties, the court could acquire no jurisdiction while the pro-
perty was in the custody of the Chancery Court. Fulton v. 1_hrley 401.
22. Federdl courts where they have jurisdiction, will enforce the same
rules in the adjustment of claims against ancillary executors, as local
courts would in favor of their citizens. Walker v. Walker's Rers., 448.
23. The court first taking jurisdiction will retain it where the jurisdic-
tion is concurrent. Trowbridge v. Rawson Adm., 711.
24. The Federal courts have no jurisdiction under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act, of a suit for real estate, where the issue turns solely upon
the personal identity of the claimants. Carpenter v. Williams, 519.
COVENANT. See IuSBAWD n WIFE, 9; vaicO AND runctAsFa. 5 8, 10.
L Cannot be implied in a contract drawn technically in form, and with
obvious attention to details. Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
192.
2. Covenant creating easement runs with the land. Norfleet v. Crom-
well, 446.
3. Covenants are the proper mode of creating such servitudes as consist
in acts to be done by the owner of the servient land. Id.
CRLAUNAL LAW.
L In General.
1. Under the statutes of Illinois, juries in criminal cases are judges of
the law as well as of the facts. Adams v. People, 58.
2. If a person threatened with danger, acts from reasonable and honest
convictions, he will not be held responsible for a mistake as to the extent
of the danger. Id.
3. A person cannot provoke a quarrel and then justify killing one in
it. Id.
4. A new trial will not be granted to prove the dying declarations of the
deceased, that he did not wish the accused hurt. Id.
5. An arrest by a private individual is excused only where a felony has
in fact been committed, and there was reasonable ground to suspect the
person arrested of its commission. Burns v. Erben, 59.
6. Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to the circumstances, in
actions for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the question of
probable cause Is one of law and not for the jury. Id.-
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7. The passing with intent to defraud, of a United States Treasury note,
is an offense against the State as well as the United States. In re Truman,
192.
& Whether confessions of crime are voluntary, is to be determined by
tle judge trying the cause. State v. Squeers, 511.
9. Confession made under a hope of a settlement not admissible.
Train v. State, 511.
10. It is no ground for setting aside a verdict of guilty, that it was found
on the testimony of accomplices. .People v. Lawton, 638.
11. It is well settled that before the acts and declarations of one party
can be received in evidence against another, in a criminal prosecution,
there must be proof of a conspiracy aliunde. Street v. State, 750.
12. But a conspiracy may be proved like other controverted facts, by the
acts of parties, or by circumstances, as well as their agreement. Id.
13. Bail is never allowed in capital cases, where the proof is evident and
the presumption great: In re Bennoit, 1 Ia. 142, cited and approved. M.
14. An indictment for murder furnishes no presumption against the ac.
cused at his trial, but as regards all intermediate proceedings between in.
dictment and trial, it furnishes the strongest possible presumption o
guilt. rd.
15. When the returns show that the accused was arrested on a bench
warrant upon an indictment for murder, the "detention" Is legal; in such
cases,instead of stating in the petition for habeas corpus that the imprison.
ment is illegal, it should claim that the prisoner is entitled to bail. d.
16. The jurisdiction of Supreme Court to grant bail in cases brought
up on writ of error, is purely revisory and correctional. The judgment
below must be regarded as presumptively right till error is shown. Id.
17. Upon questions of bail, this court approves the rule (laid down in 1
Ashmead 234, and 19 Ohio 141), to refuse bail In a ease of malicious homi-
cide where the judge would sustain a capital convictionby a jury on evi.
denceof guilt, such as that pr6duced on the application for bail, and to
allow bail when the prosecutor's evidence was of less efficiency. Id.
II. Murder. Seq. ante, 14, 15.
1. Upon an indictment for murder where the defense is insanity the
jury should acquit if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to the soundness
of mind of the prisoner at the time of the homicide, although they believe
he had judgment and reason sufficient to discriminate between right and
wrong in the ordinary affairs of life. He is as much entitled to the benefit
of a doubt on that as on any other material fact in the 6ase. Stevens v.
State of Indiana, 530.
19. Anl instruction that "If the jury believe that the defendant knew the
difference between right and wrongin respect to the actin question; if he
was conscious that such act was one which he ought not to do," he was
responsible for his act, is erroneous. Id.
II .Bobbery.
20. Indictment for robbery notalleging thatthepropertywas taken from
the person, by defendant, is fatally defective. Stegar v. State, 511.
IV. brgery.
21. While the uttering of several drafts is one indivisible act, the forgery
of each is a separate offense. Barton v. State, 122.
V. .Bigamy.
22. Indictment for, must allege that the fIrst marriage was lawful.
.Ming v. State, 511.
VI. Gambling.
23. Is a crime according to laws of New Hampshire. Johnsms v. Ferris,
715.
VII. Burglary.
24. Under indictment for burglary, prisoner may be convicted of attempt
to commit. Peouple v. Lawton, 638.
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VIL 1 brcible Erury and Detainer.
25. The grantee of one who bad the possession of land, but who never
had, himself, cannot maintain an action for forcible entry and detainer.
Ncartnej's Adm. v. Alderson, 321.
26. In forcible entry actions evidence concerning the possession of the
locus in quo must be relevant. Morgan v. Higgins, 322.
27. The Act of April 2d, 1866, of California, making an entry in the night,
and refusal to deliver up possession, a forcible entry, is not unconstitu.
tional. Mfecham v. McKay, 322.
IX. Larceny.
2& In an indictment for larceny, the taue of the article alleged to be
stolen must be stated. Davis v. State, 512.
CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WIF I.
DAM. See RIrAwAic Owwra, 1.
DAMAGES. SEE B-OXER, 8; HUS3AND AND Wirx, 40.
1. Vindictive, forillegal arrest and false Imprisonment, shouldbe allowed
against a peace officer, only where the arrest was made in bad faith.
Hamlin v. Spaulding, 123.
2. The measure of damages for breach of contract of a common carrier
to deliver goods according to promise, is the difference between the value
when they are delivered and what they were wQrth to the consignor, if
delivered at the time promised. Deming v. Grand Trunk . B. 509.
3. Damage to be recovered must be both the natural and proximate
consequence from the wrong complained of, and not from the wrongful
act of a third party remotely induced thereby. Cuff v. The N. &N. Y. R.
B. Co., 541.
4. The intervention of the independent act of a third person, between
the wrong complained of and the injury sustained, which act was the im-
mediate cause of the injury, is made a test of that remoteness of damage
which forbids recovery. Id.
5. Only damages actually proven allowed for cutting timber on vacant.
land, when defendant believed it was his land. Wlining Co. v. Irby, 5M
6. Costs incurred in an action of trover and conversion cannot be re.
covered as damages in a subsequent action. Harris v. Eldred, 647.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See WAR, I.
I. Sale or Cbnveyance FraudulenZ as to Creditors
1. The law will not permit a man owing debts to devote his capital, in-
dustry or credit, to the accumulation of property to be held by a third
person for the benefitof himself or family, to the exclusion of his creditors.
Waddingham's Executors v. Toker, 193.
2. A grantee of chattels will not be affected by an intent to delay credi-
tors on the part of the grantor, if such fraudulent intent was unknown to
him. Atwood v. Simpson, 320.
3. Money deposited in bank for the benefit of a creditor, without his
authority, is not a payment of a debt. MPreeholders v. Thomas, 520.
4. Where debtors, immediately before an assignment, buy goods they do
not intend to pay for, it is sufficient to warrant the finding of a fraudulent
intent. Wraverly Nat. Bank v. Halsey, 713.
LL Insolvency of Debtor.
5. Any person imprisoned upon an execution to enforce a decree of ali-
mony, is within the insolvent act of lew Hampshire. Shannon's C(se,126
I1. Payrent. See ante, 3.
6. In the absence of any understanding between mutual debtors that
the debts shall be applied to each other, one may assign his, though the
other is thereby prevented from recovering. .McConnaughey v. Chambers,
582.
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1. Certificates of stock and coupon government bonds will pass as a
donatio mortis cousa, by delivery alone. Fblsh, Ezecutor, v. &=on, 261.
2. The assets of a non-resident intestate are applied according to the
laws of the State where situated, and not according to the laws of his
domicil. Carson v. Oates, 38.
DEED. See EsToPrPx, 4,5; EVIDENoE, 7,8; HUSBAND AND WIrr, 22,32,34; IN-
YANT, 1.
1. Whatever will pass by words in a grant will be excepted by like words
in an exception. Page v. Palmer, 512.
2. Heirs and assigns must be expressly mentioned to be bound by a co n-
dition subsequent. Id.
8. The words to, from and by, in a deed, are terms of exclusion in refer.
ence to boundaries. Wells v. Jackson Iron Cb., 513.
4. Recital in is only evidence against pat-ties and their privies. Arfning
Co. v. Isby, 638.
5. Exception of rights, in a deed, in the nature of an easement, enures
to the benefft of grantor, his heirs and assigns, without words of limita-
tion. Emerson v. iooney, 713.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIpi; .
DOWER. See HUSBAND A-ND WiFE, IL
EASEMENT. See CovznAnT, 2, 8; DiED, 5.
1. The owner of land on which there is a pond or reservoir of surface
water, cannot lawfully discharge it through an artificial channel directly
upon the land of another, greatly to his injury. .PeUigrew v. Village of
Evansville et al., 126.
2. The use of a way for more than twenty years does not, as a matter of
law, establish a right by prescription. Burnham v. Me Question, 514.
3. A way over adjoining land used to approach a grist mill, will not pass
as appurtenanton the sale of the mill, if it is otherwise accessible, unless
expressly mentioned. 1'lumpton v. Converie, 578.
EJ ECTMENT. See JuDGMENT, 5.
Plaintiff in ejectment, who has recovered rents as mesne profls for the
year in which recovery is had, is not entitled to the growing crop. Gard-
ner V.erey, 639.
ELECTION. See EQUITY ,2.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See TAxATION, 7,8.
The doctrine of eminent domain is strictly applicable only to the con-
demnation of property and not to the collection of a tax. Barward v.
St. Clair Drainage Co., 718.
EQUITY. See HUSBAND AND WIF, 10; LimITATIONs, 5; NEW TRIAL, 1.
1. A court of chancery has no power to prevent the holding of. an elec.
tion of officers. People ex rel. . num v. Galesbury, 26.
2. A court of chancery has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of
an election of the directors of a private corporation. Owen v. Whitaker,
318.
3. In equity, time is not of the essence of a contract unless expressly
made so. Bullock v. Adams' Ezrs., 385.
4. Demurrer to bill to open judgment on warranty for sale of a slave is
properly sustained for want of equity. Benfroe v. McDaniel, 639.
5. Blil to marshal assets, on the sole ground that there are numerous
claims, will not be sustained. Bryan v. Bickson, 639.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See ADMIRALTY 9; Practice, 4,5.
. An entire case cannot be carried up by proceedings in error, but only
particular errors in the rulings of the court. Capen v. 'eckketm, 13.
796 INDEX.
ER13ORS AND APPEALS.
2. Where, however, the question was whether several articles annexed
to tue freehold were a part of the realty or were personal property, and
the court below in a bill of exceptions stated the facts with regard to each,
and its decision as to its character, it was held that the decision as to each
could be reviewed on a writ of error. Id.
S. It is error, entitling the aggrieved party to a reversal, for a court, on
motion of a plaintiff, to strike out of an answer that which constitutes a
good defense, and on which the defendant may chiefly rely. fandelbaum
V. The .Peopte, 194.
4. A writ of error to the Supreme Court cannot be sustained inthe name
of a steamboat. Steambolt Burns, 441.
5 A writ of error lies to the judgment of a State court in certain cases,
though it may not be actually the highest court of law or equity in the
State. - Downham v. .Alexandria, 582.
6. No writ of error to a State court can issue without. allowance by the
proper judge. Gleason v. lorida, 582.
ESCAPE. I
Indulgences permitted to a person committed to jail on final process, of
going outside, constitute a voluntary escape. Biley v. Whiltiker, 714.
ESTATES.
EYSTRAITS UPON5 THE ALIE NATIOZS AlD ExJOyXSNT or ESTATTE, 394, 457, 52
ESTOPPEL. See BAsx, 10, 11.
1. A record of ajudgment on the same subject-matter, referred to in a
finding, cannot be set up as an estoppel, wlthout showingon whatgrounds
the court put its decision. United SaLIes v. Lane, 122.
2. Corporations may be estopped as to matters within the scope of their
powers, without a formal assent on their records. Kneeland v. Gilman,
263.
8. A false representation notacted upon, worksno estoppelforthe party
by whom it Is made. Devries v. HZaywood, 447. "
4. Where one makes a deed of land convenanting that he is the owner,
and subsequently acquires an outstanding and adverse title, such title
enures to the grantee on the ground of estoppel. Irvine v. Irvine, 578.
5. Grantee accepting a deed is estopped to deny thegrantor's title though
the instrument is a deed poll and not signed by grantee. Eerson v.
M3ooney, 713. -
EVTIDENCE. See AGmT, 9; CRibNAL LAw, 11 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE 18, 36, 38,
39 ; IlxSunmwcC. 7, NElENCE 8; SPr.ioizo PERFoRMANcz, 7 ; TESrASS, 17.
1. Tending to prove a contract of a certain character should be submit.
ted to the Jury Gregg v. .Drakely, 192.
2. A judgment of divorce not extended uponthe records ofacourt, may
De proved by a certified copy of the docket entry of the libel, and the
clerk's memoranda of the action of the court thereon. ,ay v. East Liver-
more, 197.
Where a plea, denying the corporate existence of the plaintiff suing as a
corporation, Is pleaded, the original articles of association, properly re-
corded, may be read in evidence, without a certificate of the clerk that it
is a true copy. librtin et al. v. iPump Cb., 260.
4. In actions to recover damages for the death of a person, the dying
declarations of the person killed are not admissible. Marshall v. 0. & G
a. B. Co., 26M
5. Ajury is notbound to give equal credit to each part of the statement
of an accused person. Griswold v. The State, 2 2.
6. The proper proof of papers on file in government offices is by certified
copies from those who have them in custody. Barney v. &Shclmder, 447.
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7. The copy of a deed not in the chain of title Is evidence only of the
contents of the paper, and requires the same proof of execution as the
original. Wells v. rackon ron Cb., 513.
& The execution, attestation, acknowledgment and recording of a deed,
is only prima facie evidence of delivery. Xd.
9. Evidence that a telegram was sent to A at a certain place, and an an-
swer received from the place, purporting to come from A, is not compe-
tent proof that he was there. Howley v. Whipple, 514.
10. A memorandum Is only evidence when the witness cannot state the
particulars of it from recollection, and swears it was correct when made.
Zelsen v. Pletcher, 514.
IL Copy of verdict in equity case, without the rest of the record, Is not
evidence. Mitchell v. .Mtchell, 639.
12 The Circuit Court of Illinois will take judicial notice of who are its
officers, as of a clerk, whose name is attached to a jurat without official
designation. Dyer v. Last, 714.
13. Declarations of a vendor, made before sale, are admissible in evi-
dence In a suit where vendee is a party. Randegger v. Earhardt, 714.
14. Parol evidence, to show that property not answering the written
description in a mortgage, was intended to be included, is inadtnissible.
Hutton v. Arnett, 775.
EXECUTION. See ADMiRALTY, 11; EscAPr,1; HOMesTEAD, 1; MAwDAus, 4.
1. A creditor who has recovered a judgment against the executor of a
surety may enforce his claim by execution against the property of such
executor. Beall's Erecutor v. Osbourn, 319.
2. An execution levied prior to the return day, will not continue in force
for the purpose of a fresh levy on other property, subsequent to the re.
turn day. Donald v. Gronefteld, 3"21.
2. Can only be satisfied by a seizure and sale of property, orby payment
in coin or such currency as the plaintiff authorizes the sheriff to receive.
McKay v. Smitherian, 447.
rsXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See AcTION, 5; CON-EDERATE STATrS,
19; CouRTS, 22.
1. An act on of an administrator's bond, in Missouri, has ten years to
ran from the date of the accruing of the action. Martin v..YAapp, 324.
2. A note given byan executor to an attorney for his services to the es.
tate, is payable by the maker personally. Kessler v. Ral, 447.
3. Administrator held liable for paying over distributive shares to the
Confederate States under protest of sequestration. State to use of (Rsher
v. .Bitchey, 579.
4. The sale of all property, by executors and administrators, except an-
nual crops actually carried to market, must be at public auction. Bfeal v.
Patton, 646.
FENCES.
1. The "fence laws" which make a railroad company liable forinjury to
cattle, etc., on their track, where there Is no fence, whether the company
be negligent or not, contemplate injury from direct and actual collision.
Lafferty v. St. Joseph B. R., 229.
2. Where cattle or horses on the track are frightened, and in running or
jumping out of danger are injured. but there is no collision with the loco-
motive or cars, the railroad company is not liable. fid.
FIXTURES.
1. Machinery actually attached to the land will be presumed to be for
improvement and will be deemed a fixture. 1'orterv. Cromwell, 60.
2. In determining the question of fixtures, the intention of the person
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who attaches them to the realtyls an important element tobe con sdered.
d.
3. To constitute a Axture, it Is necessary that It should appear, from a'
the circumstances, that a permanent annexation of the article to the free-
hold was intended. Cbpen v. Peckham, 136.
4. The character of the annexation is of great importance as showing
the intent with which it was made. Id.
5. A windlass used in a slaughter-house, which pasted through and
turned in timbers firmly secured to the building, held to be part of the
realty. Id
6. Sundry other articles, used in the samebuilding, not so firmlysecured
to the building, held to be personal property. Id.
7. A building erected on another's land under an agreement that it may
be removed at the builder's pleasure, does not become real estate. Good-
nman v. Han. & St. Jo& P P, 321.
FRAUD. See LimnTATiows, 15,16,17.
1. The owners of any property may form an association or partnership
with others, and may sell their property to the company at any price
agreed on, provided there be no fraudulent representations made by them,
and no such confidential relation arises, as to make them liable to account
for any profit realized on such sale. Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore ef l, 96.
2. But where persons have formed an association, or are dealing in con-
templation of one, then they stand in a confidential relation to each other
and to all who may subsequently become members, and they cannot pur-
chase any property and sell it to the company at an advance without a
full disclosure of all the facts. If they do so the company may compel
them to account for the profit. Id.
3. An oil company was formed upon property belonging to some of the
defendants: the valuation of the property was represented by stock to a
certain amount, and part of this stock was given by the defendants who
had owned the land to the other defendants who became theactiveparties
in getting up the company. Held (no misrepresentation being proved),
that neither class of the defendants were liable to other subscribers to
the stock of the company. Id.
4. In the examination of questions of fraud, courts will look into all the
circumstances, and while positive proof is not required, mere suspicion
will not be deemed sufficient ground to establish it. Waddingham's82re-
cuter8 v. Loker, 193.
5. A person holding a warranty deed of land as security for a loan, is not
chargeable with fraud if, in order to obtain payment, he, at the request of
the other parties, gives a warranty deed of the same land to a third person
who furnishes money to pay the original loan, although the title proves
not to be good. if it doesnot appear that he knew of the defect. Grani v.
Granf, 194.
FRAUDS. STATUTE OF.
1. Where the defendant told the plaintiff he was not able to marry her
then, but promised her he would marry her within four years, it not ap-
pearing that the parties understood that the promise was not to be per-
formed within one year, such promise is not within the statute of frauds.
Lawrence v. Cooke, 194.
2. A contract of insurance for one year is not within the statute of francs.
Malker v. 3fetropolitan Ins. C., 195.
3. An agreement that if one finds a purchaser of certain lands within a
fixed time, for a certain price, he may have all the purchaser will give
above the price, and the owner will sell and convey at such price, is not
a contract within the statute. Heyer v. -Pilips, 22.
4. Promise of a father to pay physician for his attendance on his daugh-
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ter. twenty-two years old, is not within the statute of frauds. Eddy r.
Davidson, 639.
5. Sale of growing trees, with right to enter to remove them, is an inter.
est in land. and within the statute. Howe v. Batchelder, 719.
GAMING.
1. A bet or wager in New Hampshire is void. Johnson v. Ferris, 715.
2. Money paid to procure a bet or wager cannot be recovered back. Id.
3. Party cannot recover for services in fitting horse for a race on which
money was bet. Moshee v. GHflin, 715.
OWARDIA.
May maintain action in his own name for debt due his ward. Thomas v.
Bennet, 640.
GUARANTY.
The word "accepted," written on an account, does not necessarily im.
port a guaranty by the party making the indorsement. Hatch v. Anrism,
640.
HABEAS CORPUS. See COUsTS, 2.
HIGHWAY. See Nxs~wcE, 4; TazsrAss, 3.
1. Plank roads are undoubtedly public highways. Craig v.-People, 60.
2. Where the company forfeit their charter, or abandon it, or suffer the
road to so become out of repair as to amount to an abandonment the right
of way of the company ceases and the road becomes a common highway.
Id.
3. The continuous and uninterrupted use of land as a highway, during
the period limited in sec. 85, ch. 19, R. S. 1858 (sec. S0, ch. 16, R. S. 1849), cre-
ates a prescriptive right in favor of the public. Hanson et at. v. Taylor,
194.
4. A city will be liable to a person injured from ice or snow suffered to
remain on a sidewalk in such an uneven form that one cannot walk over
it. Cook v. City of .filwaukee, 263.
5. A city is not liable for injuries resulting from a highway that has sud-
denly become deficient or out of repair, unless it had notice. Wardv.2bwn
of .effer-son, 263.
6. A reservation in a grant, ', if ever wanted for a road," means a public
highway. Morgan v.-Palmer, 512.
HOMESTEAD.
1. Where the owner of a homestead in Illinois removes with his family
to another State, and, on his return to Illinois in about a year, resides in a
different county, it is such an abandonment of his homestead as renders It
liable to levy and sale under execution Mahcer v. MfConaga, 60.
2. Is exempt from attachment on adebtwhich accrnedafter thepurchase
and record of the deed, but before the housekeeper took possession. West
River Bank v. Gale, 640.
3. Is exempt-during the absence of the owner while sojourning at anoth-
er place, If the intention is to return. Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
L Marriage and Divorce. See EVIDENCE, 2; JUDGMErNT, 3.
1. It is a rule of the common law that contracts between husband and
wife are void, and will not be enforced. Sweeney et ur. v. Damrow, 6L
2. But where they have been made in good faith and are executed, they
are valid. Id.
& The courts of Wisconsin have jurisdiction to grant a divorce for acts
of cruelty committed in another State, at the suit of one who has resided
in the State one year. Shafer v. Bushnell, 123.
800 INDEX.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
4. A decree for divorce should not direct the payment of arrears of al.
mony previously ordered by the court. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2I.
5. An application for divorce, on the ground of desertion, must make out
with reasonable certainty every element of tle statutory cause, or no de-
cree can be granted. Angier v. Angier, 335.
6. The statute of Pennsylvania requires, moreover, that the application
shall be made 1I In sincerity and truth for the causes mentioned," and if
the court be of opinion, on the evidence, that the libelant has not shown
gool faith in the application, and that the acts complained of were the
natural result of his own management and scheming to that end, a decree
will be refused. Ad.
7. Evidence of libelant's acts and conduct toward his wife is therefore
admissible to show his motives in the application. d.
S. This case is to be distinguished from Eshbach v. RiYbach. 11 Harris,
34S, and others which rule that if a wife deserts the habitation of her hus-
band, she Is only justified by such acts as would entitle her to a divorce.
Here the husband broke up the home, and never in good faith offered her
another. Id.
9. A covenant bya husband for the maintenance of the wife, contained
in a deed of separation, will be enforced in equity. WFadker V. Walker's
'r, 448.
10. A court of equity has jurisdiction to decree alimony to a wife on pe-
tition, though no divorce is asked. Galland v. Gotland, 463.
11. A statute authorizing the courts of a State to grant alimony in suits
for divorce does not thereby prohibit the granting of alimony in othel
cases. d.
12. Ante-nuptial contracts, in consideration of marriage, should be libe.
rally construed to effect the intention. Ardis v..Printup, 641.
13. The existence of a marriage having been established, the Probate
Court has no jurisdiction to try its validity. Tiser v. Lockwood, 641.
14. A marriage, void ab initio, on account of fraud or force, may be ratt
fled by injured party. Hampstead v.Plaistow, 715.
15. Voluntary cohabitation, after knowledge of the fraud, cures the de
fect. _I.
16. INDIANA DIvonczS, 721.
17. The statute of Illinois requires desertion for two years to obtain a
divorce, and the courts cannot prescribe a shorter perloa. Thlonas v.
2%oma, 775.
18. Evidence that a wife was absent frombome forseveral daysatatme,
and her reputation for chastity was bad, is insufficient to establish a charge
of adultery. Id.
1Q. It is not a ground for a divorce within the statute that a party has
committed a larceny, when no conviction has been had. Id.
. Curtesy, Dower. See post, 29.
20. Real property, acquired in Wisconsin by a husband, is not subject to
a nuptial contract between the husband and wife, who at the time of mar-
riage were domiciled In Prussia. Fuss v. Tuss, 263.
21. Widow is entitled to a share of her husband's estate, althongh he was
insane when he married. Wiser v. Lockwood's Es., 641.
22. A married woman who signs a deed with her husband, and acknowl.
edges it before the proper officer, relinquishes her dower in the property,
though her name is not mentioned in the body of the deed. ohnson v.
Montgomer , 715.
Ili. Separate Estate of wife.
23. Where a married woman, jointly with her husband, conveys her sep
arate estate in trust, to secure a debt of her husband, remainder to the
husband and wife, or their legal representatives-Held, that by the provi-
sion of the deed it belongs to the wife alone. Eisnner v. Walsh, 195.
24. The debts of a married woman in Massachusetts are not a lien upon
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her separate estate, unless made so by the decree of a court of equity.
Armstrong v. Boss, 323.
25. The fruits of the wife's labor and skill, where her husband co-oper-
ates, are not her separate property. Bank v. Sprague, 823.
25. A husband is chargeable as trustee, with the income of his wife's sep.
arate property. Walker v. Walker's ERr*&., 448
27. Widow not estopped from asserting her claim for her separate mon-
eys, against her husband's estate, by accepting provision under his wilL
Id.
2. The statutes of Ohio, in relation to the property of married women,
have in effect put such property, during coverture, in the position of pro-
perty limited by a deed of trust to the sole and separate use of the wife
and where there is no express trust, the husband will be treated as a trus-
tee. Westerman v. Westerman, 690.
29. The husband's curtesy is not entirely, and in all cases destroyed, but
exists contingent upon circumstances prescribed by the statutes. Ad.
30. Therefore, the common law rule that a secret conveyance of her
realty by a woman under contemplation of marriage, is fraudulent and
void against the husband, is not entirely destroyed by the statutes. Id.
31. A woman just before marriage conveyed land to her children by a
former marriage. The land was not fully paid for by her at the time of
the conveyance, and her grantor subsequently obtained judgment against
her and her husband for the balance of the purehase-money, which the
husband was compelled to pay. HReld 1. That the husband having paid
the judgment out of his own money, was entitled to be subrogated to the
vendor's lien against the land, and could enforce the repayment of h4s
money by sale of the land. 2. That the conveyance to the children was
fraudulent as to the husband, and must be set aside. I.
IV. Powers of Married Women.
32. The deed or mortgage of a married woman for lands, in Massachu-
setts, though duly acknowledged, if made without her husband is void,
Armstrong v. oss, 323.
33. A married womanin Indiana can only charge her real estate by such
contracts as make it profitable to her. Smith v. Howe and Wife, 449.
34. Deed of widow executed while a minor is voidable. Vier v. Lock-
wood'cs Bs., 641.
35. Where wife carries on separate business from her husband, in her
own name, he will not be liable for a bill of goods sold to the wife on
credit. Tuttle v. Hoag, 642.
V. Actions by and against Eusband and Wife.
36. In an action for damages, by a husband and wife against a railroad
company, for permanent injuries received by the wife, the Carlisle tables
may be admitted to show the expectancy of the wife'slife, when it appears
from the evidencethat. by reason of such injurlesa servant had been, and
probably would have to be, employed to do the work the wife had been
accustomed to do. McDonald et ux. v. Chicago & r W. a, 10.
31. Section 2771, of the Revised Statutes of Iowa, changes the common
law rule, that, in an action wherein the husband and wife were joined, for
an injury to the wife, the recovery was limited to damages for that injury
alone, and did notembrace the injury to the husband; and under said
section the husband, in such an action, may join thereto a claim in his
own right, and recover for the loss of services of the wife, occasioned by
the injury. Id.
38. Declarations of the husband as to property, after the title to the same
is vested in the wife, are not competant evidence against her. GttleUiev.
Walker, 515.
39. A divorced wife is incompetent to testify in behalf of her formerhus.
band, In a suit by him against her seducer. -ea v. fTcker, 642.
40. In an action of crim. con., the defendant may prove the adulterous
51
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conduct of the husband, in mltigaton of damages, but not in bar of the so.
tion. Xd
41. Or that the plaintiffs wife had beeil guilty ofadulterybefore. Td.
42. At mommon law, an action lay against husband and wife jointly, for
a libel by the wife alone, which is the rule in New York. Tait v. Cilberwon
and Wife, 715.
WNFANT. See HUSBAwD ,ANiD Wiyz, 34; LrxirAroNs, 9.
1. The deed of an infant is voidable only; not void. Ivne v. Irvine, 579.
2. The ratification after age must be clear and unequivocal. Id.
INJUNCTION. See BmAuvrcuTc, 1; MAu DAUS, 10; MUNICIPAL CORORATION,
3; NmsAxc, 2,4; TazspAss, 6; WATxa Awn WArTecounsrs.
1. A preliminary injunction will not be granted in behalf of the owners
of building lots held for sale, to restrain the erection near them of a
slaughter-house,-where it is not alleged that any one-intends to erect any
buildings upon them. Atorney General v. Steward, 887.
2. An injunction follows the appointment of a receiver almobst as a mat.
ter of course. Leiglwrtner v. lWeissinborn, 88.
.Bill to restrain trespasses, must allege that respondent Is insolvent,
or that it cannot be compensated by damages. Weigel v. Wask 647.
INNKEEPER.
A person charged for transient accommodation at an inn, Is entitled to
all the rights of a guest, though not a traveler. Walling v. lber, 618.
INSANITY. See CmwuaNA LAw. 18.
Tan BuRD= or Paoor IN CAszs o1 IqsANITY, 201, 29.
INSOLVENT. See Dxnrou AxN CaRIron, 5.
INSUIRANCE. See AGRmT, 1; Coamorr os LAws; Cos'rrofAn LAw, 25
1. Insurers who have taken possession of goods abandoned at an inter.
mediate port, on account of damage occurring from the fault of the car-
rier, cannot bold the carrier liable on his engagement to deliver in good
order and condition. Propeler Mohawk, 32&
2. A.contract of, against fire, not required to be in writing by the com-
mon law; nor by the statutes of Maine. Walker v. Ins. Co., 195.
3. Where a mutual insurance company was authorized by a supplement
to its charter to make insurances "for a specific rate of premium to be
paid in cash, In the same manner as insurance companies, other than mu-
tual insurance companies, are accustomed to do," the company could take
a note for such premiums. The object of the supplement was to enable
the company to issue two classes of policies, one on the mutual plan to
persons who should become members, and one on the non-mutual plan to
persons who should not become members, but should pay their premiums
in cash. The acceptance of a note by the company was a mere extension
of the time of payment, and did not make it any the less a payment in
cash. Carey v. _Nagel, 862.
4. The bankruptcy of the company is no defense to an-action by the as-
signee on such a note. Id.
5. The return of the premium Is a prerequisite to the right to terminate
the risk. HathJrn v. Gernmna Ins. Lb., 85.
6. Increase of risk by making repairs, will not prevent recovery on pol-
icy, unless the loss was caused by such increased risk. Washngtan Ins.
Co. v. Daviron, 49.
7. Evidence of the secretary of an insurance company, as an expert to
show the meaning of terms in the policy, is not admissible. Id.
S Holding a vessel for an unreasonable time, is a constructive accept-
unce ofanabandonment. Cpdin v. Ins. Co., 450.
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9. Representations to an insurer must, in order to bind, be made by the
party, or adopted by him. Harmony Co. v. Hazelurd, 45L
10. The sale of property and taking back a mortgage of it, does not
change the title within the meaning of a policy. Rilis v. Im. Cb., 5&
1L The sale by one member of all his interest in the partnership proper-
ty does not necessarily pass a policy. rd.
12. Consent to an endorsement on a policy, "that payment maybe made
to another party in case of loss," is no proof of assent to a sale of the pro-
perty. Bate" v. Etgiable Ins. Co., 776.
INTEREST. See AGmr, 15.
Is recoverable in an action for the value of an article loaned, only when
there has been unreasonable delay in payment. Davis v. Kenaga, 776.
JiTERNAL REVENUE. See STATuTics.
L Property was seized by a collector of internal revenue for an alleged
violation of internal revenue laws, was libeled for forfeiture in the U. S.
District Court, the cause tried, verdict given for the claimant, and certif.
cate of probable cause granted. Claimant sued the collector to recover
the value of the property so seized, and never returned to him. Held, he
is entitled to recover. Certificate of probable cause is no defense in such
action, unless the collector shall have forthwith returned theseizedgoods
to the claimant. BmiMt v. Averil, 47.
2. Although the marshal had returned the property that he had at-
tached, it is nevertheless not his duty, but thatof the collector, tosee that
the same is surrendered to the claimant. Id.
3. The jurisdiction in revenue cases under the Act of March 2,1833, was
taken away by the Act of July 13,1866. Horhal v. CoUoector, 451.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See TasrAss, 18; WAn.
1. The laws of war authorize an occupying conquerer to establish such
government as he may deem proper over hostile country in his occupa-
tion and control. Hefferman v. .Porter, 41.
2. If in such case the commanding officer establish a commission with
the powers and to perform, for the time being, the duties of the courts of
law, a decision by such tribunal upon a case tried before it is binding and
conclusive. Id.
8. The judgment of the eill tribunal established by the United States
military commander in'Tennessee during the late war may be pleaded in
bar to an action of the same cause in a State court after the war. Id.
4. Vhen, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent territory
were occupied by the Federal forces, the Presidentascommander-in-chief,
as a measure of government of such territory, had power legally to estab-
lish therein courts for the determination of controversies and the admin-
istration ofJustice. Law v. Wallerstein, 293.
5. The United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, organ-
ized under an order of the President, of October 20,1862, was authorized to
exercise the jurisdiction conferred by that order-that is to say, "to hear
try and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law:
equity, revenue and admiralty." Id.
6. When Congress, by virtue of its constitutional authorityover national
courts, enacted that "
a l judgments, orders, decrees and decisions" of the
"United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, in cases
which would ordinarily have been properly cognizable by the Circuit
Court of the United States, should be transferred to" anbecome the.judg-
ments, orders, decrees and decisions of that court, enforced, pleaded and
proved accordingly, a decree in admiralty rendered in said United States'
provisional Court, became at once the decree of the United States Circuit
Court, and from it an appeallay to the Supreme Court of the United States
AL.
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JUOGMENT. See AcCoD A.ND SATmiA0TION, 1; Evmwxsz, 2; Tzzh A0irA z
L&w, 3; rrLLDIG, &
1. Ajudgment has precedence over an unrecorded mortgage. Guieam
-T. udyp, 14
2. The holder of a judgment cannot legally bind bimself by any species
of executory agreement, to accept a less sum than is actually due thereon
and discharge the judgment. Garvey v. Tarvis et ta., 124.
8. The effect which shall be given to a decree of divorce, obtained In In-
diana, in New York, depends on the jurisdiction of the court making the
decree. Hoffman v. Hoffman, W2.
4. In an action on a jugdment, the record cannot be dispensed with or
supplied by other evidence. Walton fl'r v. McKesson, 885.
5. In an action of ejectment, where the plaintiffs title is that of a volun.
tary purchaser under an execution void because the lien of the judgment
had expired, and the title of the defendant is that of a bonajlde purchaser
from the debtor during the continuance of the lien, it is not competent
for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant promised the creditor, under
whose execution the land was sold, to pay the judgment, and that he did
not do so, in consequence of which thelen was suffered to expire. The fact,
If proved, would not extend the-lien of the judgment. Noirris v. Taeskn,
42L
6. The lien of a judgment on real estate, is coextensive with the limits
of the county where it is rendered. Rnney v. Knoebel, 716.
7. One judgment creditor is not entitled to have another judgment set
aside, for defects not affecting the jurisdiction of the court, where there is
no fraud. Gere v. Gundl.ch, 716.
fUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See Aro, 6.
The entering ofjudgment by a justice Is a ministerial and not judicial
act. Crhrisqe v. an 14cw, 716.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See BvxaRurr, 1.
L The landlord has no such possession as will enable him to complain of
a disseisin of his tenant. AfeClatnei j' Adm'z v. Alderson, 321.
2. Tenant willbe allowed a reasonable time after the dissolution of an
injunction against the removal of fixtures, to demand and remove the
same. Goodman v. Ham &W. Jroe. R , 82L
. A quit claim deed of leased premlses does not operate as a release of
rent already accrued. .olnson v. Muz y, 5W.
4. The mere fact of a tenantbeing mortgagee after condition broken does
not absolve him from payment ofrent. Id.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See Cox ST TuiowAL LA"w, 9-2.
LIBEL. See HusBAwD AND Wiwr, 42.
LICENSE. See CoxsTrruTioxAL LAw, 24.
LIEN. See BEAxz, 2; BAwsaurT'T, 18; Commom CsnxxA 12; JuDexmrr, 5, 6;
VannOn AND Pow-a sya, 17.
LIMITATIONS. See EBxctrTons Ann AummsTrnAiTOs,l; Pnr.cTiar,16.
1. In the absende of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is thatan
indorsement of credit on a note was made at the time it purports to bear
date. oarter v. Carter, 195.
2. The statute of limitations has no application to an express truak
where there is no disclaimer. &ymour v. 1reer, 199.
3. A debt created by award is not founded on any contract or lending,
and is therefore not within the statute of limitations. Moore v. Green .
Railwaly Co., 225.
4. Where the act of incorporation of a railroad company provided that
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before commencing to use the street the company should purchase the
stock, etc., of an omnibus line, at a price to be assessed by three disin-
terested persons chosen as the act provided, the assessment of the price by
such persons was not an award butan appraisement based on the contract
of the parties, and was therefore within the statute of limitations. Ia.
5. In a court of equity the statute of limitations on a cause of action
which has been fraudulently concealed, runs from the discovery of the
fraud. The principle applied to a defalcation by the cashier of a bank,
though a more frequent and diligent examination of his affairs by the
offlcers of the bank ought to have. disclosed the defalcation within the
statutory period after its occurrence. Sarks v. hrmers' Bk, 365.
6. An exclusive adverse possession for more than twenty years by a
mortgage is a complete bar to a suit:to recover possssion by mortgagor
Croole v. Glenn, 452.
7. The statute of limitations appMes to trust estates. Id.
& Thelegislature isthe exclusive judge of the reasonableness ofthetime
within which an action may be brought, to enforce a right springing
from legislative enactment. Des Mloss v. .ewton, 452.
9. No exception can be claimed in favor of minors unless they are ex-
pressly mentioned by the statute as excepted. Id.
10. Statutes of limitation do not run during the rebellion against per-
sons residing out of the rebellious States. The -,otecar, 516.
11. The Act of March, 1867, is an enabling Act. Id.
12. Suit on a coupon Is not barred by the statute of limitations, unless
suit of the bond itself would be barred. City v. Lamson, 577.
13. An oficer by defendant's attorney to settle a claim, without defend.
ant's authority, does not take a case out of the statute of limitations.
Horris v. azlehurst, 5M0.
14. Unless Congress has otherwise provided, State statutes of limitation
are applied to controversies in the Courts of the United States. 3artin v.
Smith, 694.
15. The fraud which in equity will prevent the running of the statute of
limitations is that which is secret or concealed, as distinguished from
that which is open, visible or known, and a secret or concealed fraud is in
equity a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. Id.
16. Even in case of fraud the statute will in equity begin to run as
against the plaintiff, when he has knowledge orinformation offacts which
reasonably creates the belief that the transfer is fraudulent and can be
proved to be so; and if, under all the circumstances, the plaintiffhas been
guilty of negligence in discovering or attacking the fraud, the statute will
begin to operate against him from the period his laches commenced. -rd
17. What, in the view of a court of equity will be regarded as a disovet&
of the fraud considered. Id.
18. The statute of Missouri, which provides that "actions for relief on
the ground of fraud must be brought within five years after the cause of
action accrued, but the cause of action shall be deemed not to have ac-
crued until the discovery by the aggrieved party at any time within ten
years of the facts constituting the fraud," construed and considered as in
substance enacting the equity rule on the same subject, and fixing the pe-
riod oflimitation. Id.
19. In an action by an assignee in bankruptcy of a fraudulent debtor,
where the fraud was continuos, and the debtor remained down to the
time suit was brought the real owner of the property sought to be recov-
ered and in possession of it: Hfeld, that the statute didnot bar the suit,
even though the initial fraudulent transaction took place more than live
years before suit was commenced. Id.
LIS PENDENS.
It is the duty of a defendant to plead ipendens, in abatement of a suit
Improperly brought. Bernecker v. Mer, 196.
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L A statute passed under the forms of law is binding upon al public
ministerial officers, and obedience will be enforced by mandamus. People
V. &Zomon, 232.
2. A citizen whose rights are affected by such statute has the right to
test its constitutionality by appropriate proceedings in the courts; but a
public ministerial officer has no such privilege, his official duty is to obey
the law. Id.
3. A party who has by his own illegal acts put obedience to a manda-
mus out of his power, but neglects to return that fact in his answer to the
alternative writ, so that the court, in ignorance of it, issues a peremptory
writ, is liable to punishment for contempt in not obeying the latter writ.
Ia.
4. A writ of mandamus ordering the levy and collection of a tax is an
appropriate and proper process to enforce judgments agaihst public cor
poratfous in the State of Iowa. U. S. v. 2resu.rer lfucad neCb., 415.
5. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa has
the power, and it is its duty, if necessary, to issue writs of mandamus for
this purpose. Id.
6. These writs, when thus issued, are in thenature of writs offlertfclas,
and the State courts have no power or right to interfere with their execu-
tion. Id.
7. Where writs of mandamus directed to the county treasurer, oraering
the collection of a tax, are disobeyed, thwarted, or evaded, the United
States Court issuing the writ of mandamus may, when necessary, appoint
Its marshal to execute the same and collect the taxes. Id.
8. Under what circumstances this power wilbe exercised, discussed by
DILLON, J. Id.
9. An Act of the legislature, in terms discriminating against taxeslevied
to pay judgment uponrailroadbonds and coupons, held void becauseit im.
paired the obligation of the contract under which the bonds were issued.
Id.
10. From a Federal court cannot be restrained by an injunction from a
State court. Supervisors v. Durant, 448.
11. A judgment in mandamus against an officer who has gone out of of
rce is void. The &cretary v. HcGarrahan, 581.
12. To compel the Commissioner of the General Land Office or the Sec-
retary of the Interior to Issue a patent, cannot be sustained. I.
13. Will only be awarded where a clear right is shown to have the thing
done. .PeopZe ez tel. MeiCagg v. Chicago, 642.
14. Will not be awarded where the parties have commenced other pro.
ceedingsto obtain the adjudication of a question, unless the court think
that more complete justice can be don Pee e re. v. &aomon, 717.
MARRIAGE. See HUSSAND A£D WIrZ, 1.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. The master is liable for the negligent act of his servant, though the
act be done without an express order. Gilmartin v. Mayor, 325.
2. A corporation will be held liable for injuries to one of its servants, re-
sulting from a risk of which such servant had no knowledge or informa-
tion. Bpelmca v. Fisher Iron Co., 517.
8. The rule is now not firmly established that, when the owner of lands
undertakes to do a work, which, in the ordinary mode o doing it, is a
nuisance, be Is liable for any injury which may result from it to third
persons, though the work is done by a contractor exercising an indepen-
dent employment, and employing his own servants; but when the work
is not in itself a nuisance, and the injury results from the negligence of
such contractor or his servants in the manner of executing It, the con.
tractor alone is liable, unless the owner is in default in employing an
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unskillful or improper person as the contractor. Cff v. 27-. & X .
A IL, 541.
4. The principle upon which the superior, who has contracted with
another, exercising an independent employment, for the doing of the
work, is exempt from liability forthenegligence of the latterin the execu-
tion of it, applies as between the contractor and his sub-contractor. Id.
MECHANICS' LIENS.
L It is essential to a mechanic's lien for lumber, purchased to improve
a lot, that it was purchased for that purpose. Croskey v. Corey, 386.
2. In suits to enforce a mechamc's lien the evidence must be preserved
in the record for the guidance of the superior courts. 0roskey V. North-
western Man. Co., 386.
3. An anterior mortgage takes priority over a mechanic's lien to the
extent of the value of the property at the time the lien attached. 1d.
4. A statement of a balance is not sufficient compliance with the law
requiring a claimant of a mechanic's lien to "file a just and true ac-
count." Afc lRltams v. Allen, 642.
5. A proceeding by petition to enforce a mechanic's lien is a chancery
proceeding, and governed by the rules of chancery practice. Clarke v.
Boyle, 718.
MERGER.
Is a question of intention, actual or presumed. Polk v. .Reynold. 581.
MITLITARY OFFICER. See TmrspAss.
MILTITARY SERVICE.
1. The authority to arrest a person in the military service of the govern.
ment as a deserter does not authorize the seizingand carrying away the
private property of the person arrested, Clark v. Cumins, 124.
9. The Act of June 20th, 1864, increasing the pay of private soldiers In
the army cannotbe construed as having the effect of increasing the allow-
ance to officers for servant's pay. United Blates v. Gimore, 198.
MORTGAGE. See ConponATrow, 5; Evm cz, 14; LA D oaD Aw TExr, 4;
IMITATtONs, 6; Mr AmIcs' Lrmws, 3; SnpPIna, 6.
I. Where mortgaged premises are conveyed in parcels at successive
periods, the several parcels are subject to the mortgage in the inverse
order of their alienation. Briscoe v. Pobwer, 125.
2. A decree of strict foreclosure which does not find the amount due,
and allows no time for the payment of the debt.and redemption of the
estate, cannot be sustained, in the absence of a special law authorizing it.
Clark v. BRepburn, 125.
3. A sale of land, under an agreement to re-convey at a fixed time, is
not necessarily a mortgage. Gleason v. BurA 391.
4. An agreement to let the mortgagee retain part of the land after being
paid principal and interest, is usurious. il.
& The writ of entry given by the statute of New Hampshire for the
foreclosure of a mortgage does not abate by the death of the tenant to the
writ, but his administrator becomes a party. Perce v. Jaquith, 519.
6. The written description in a mortgage of chattels must control. Hui.
ton v. Arnett, 711.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTioNAL, LAw, 3; H.onwa., 4, 5;
X-NAsrUs, 4; TAXATION, 22, 23, 26.
1. Has no power to condemn private property for public use for pur
poses not specifically named in a law. Bast St. Louis v. St. John, 56.
2. May enter, like any other, into any contract within the object fox
which the corporation was created, unless restrained bysome legal enact,
ment. Pu3lman v. 2We .fay o of v. ., 125.
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3. An injunction will not be Issned to restrain a city corporation from
entering into a contract, where there is no valid statute preventing the
making of such contract, and the case presents no facts justifying the
interference of the court on the ground of fraud. Id.
4. Has no greater power than natural persons, except through an exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain. Pettrew T. Bvnsvile, 126.
5. A town is liable for the destruction of property by a mob where it
could or ought to have prevented it, unless such destruction is caused by
the improper conduct of the plaintiff. Chadourne v. New Castle, 517.
6. Cannot be compelled by legislature to issue bonds against its will
for the erection of a public park. -People ez rel. v. Mayor of Chicago, 643.
7. A municipal corporation is not liable in a private action for damages
for injuries caused by neglect to keep its streets in repair. Detroit v
Blakeby, 670.
The cases founded on mere neglect to repair, and on acts of positive
misfeasance, reviewed and distinguished by CAMPBELL, C. J. Ia.
NEGLIGENCE. 8ee FEC; HIGHWA v 4, 5; MASTR AN SuaV AT; RAIROAD
TnRSASS, 1, 5.
L Railroads tnd private individuals, with respect to the same subject.
matter, are held to the exercise of the samedegree of diligencein prevent-
ing injury to others. 0. and J. B. B. Co. v. Shaneel, 62.
2. It is not negligence per se for a railroad to suffer grass and weeds to
accumulate on its right of way; the fact. however, is proper evidence for
the jury, who may find negligence from it. Id.
8. And unless it appears that the negligence of the company is greater
than that of a land owner, the latter cannot recover for injuries thus
&rising. Id.
4. Whether it is negligence in a railroad company to permit the accu-
mulation of grass and weeds on their track, is a question for the jury.
llinote Central a U. v. Nunn, 644.
5. There is no difference in law between negligence and gross negli-
gence. MoPheeters v. Han. & &t. Jos. B. .R., 32.
6. It is negligence in a railroad company not to keep informed as to the
condition of the track, whether It is safe for the passage of trains, or not.
T. W: and Wr Baflua y Co. v. Appereon, 386.
7. Contributory negligence on the part of a person in charge of a child
under five years of age, will prevent a recovery by theparent for the death
of the child. .. & 0.13. B. v. Thefate, 453.
& The violation of a railway company's regulation is conclusive evidence
of such negligence on the part of a passenger, as will prevent a recovery
for an injury resulting therefrom. Td.
9. The fact of the company's regulations being put in all the cars, is evi-
dence of notice to persons riding therein. Id.
NEW TRIAL. See CouRTS, 13; CRIMINAL LAw, 4.
A court of equity will not award a new trial at law, where the defense
is legal. Walker v. Kretinger, 387.
"OVATION. See CoNTRAcTc 4, 5.
NUISANCE.
L Any trade or business, howeverlawful in itself, which, from the place
pr manner in which it is carried on, materially injures the property of
others, or affects their health, or renders the enjoyment of life physically
uncomfortable, is a nuisance which itis the duty of this curt to restrain.
Attorney General v. Mteward, 387.
2. To warrant enjoining a trade as a nuisance, on the ground that it
produces discomfort to those dwellingin the neighborhood, thediscomfort
must be physical, and not such as depends upon the taste or imagination.
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Whatever is offensive, to the senses, and by such offensiveness makes fe
uncomfortable, is a nuisance. Oleveland v. Citizens,' Gas i ght Cb., 88.
3. Smoke, noise and bad odors, even when not injurious to health, cause
a discomfort against which the law will protect. Id.
4. A private person cannot enjoin the obstructing of a highway with
out showing special injury to himself. M;ccbwan v. Whiteades, 45L
OFFICE AND OFFICER. SEE CONrEDza&TB STATS, 17; 3fAnAMuS, 1,
1U; SHBmRD.
1. An agreement by the Secretary of the Interior, to pay a clerk in his
department for services rendered the government by labors abroad, is void
under the Act of August 23,1842. tansbury v. United States, 63.
2. In the United States, offices created by the legislature are not held
by grant or contract, and no person has a private property or vested
interest in them. State er rel. Attorney General v. Davis, 197.
3. An agreement to share the proceeds of a public office In consideration
of aid and money to secure an election, is against public policy and void
Xfartin v. Wade, 319.
4. If the term of an officer, created by a statute or charter, is not limited
to expire aft fixed time, or upon a specified event, but there is merely a
direction for his annual election, his original term continues, though after
the year, until a successor be duly elected and qualified. Sparks v. .lhrmn
er" Bank, 3$65.
PARTNERSHIP. See BTuns AND NOTES, 3.
1. HOW =m GOOD WILL is To BE DEALT WITH IN PAUTNERSHIPS , 6.
2. One partner cannot arrest his co-partners. Smith v. Smith, 197.
3. If the capital be misappropriated by one partner, no remedy is far.
nished by action, unless a balance is struck and a promise made to pay the
same. Id.
4. An agreement for a joint contrioution of capital, with a joint owner
ship and sharing of profit and loss, constitutes a partnership. Id.
. THE PowEa Or ONE PARTNER TO BIND TuE FIRx By SEALED IiSTUMEnTh,
265.
6. A party holding himself out as a partner will be so held, as to one
having no knowledge to the contrary. 2%omas v. Green, 325.
7. The rule that partnership creditors must look to partnership assets
only applies in civil cases. Morgan v. Skidmore, 326.
8. Partners have the power, while the partnership assets remain under
their control, to appropriate any portion of them to pay or secure their
individual debts. Bank of the Metropolis v. Sprague,326.
9. An execution on a judgment against partners for a partnership debt,
may be levied upon the individual property of either partner, although
the partnership property is sufficient to make the debt. Id.
19. In a suit to dissolve, where the facts established are such as would
entitle complainant on final hearing to a decree, a receiver V3ll in general
be appointed. Letghortner v. Weisenborn, 38.
1L Courts of equity will, for sufficient cause, dissolve a partnership
before the expiration of the term for which it was entered into. Id.
12. Whore profit cannot be obtained the partnership should be terminat-
ed. Id.
13. Where anew partnership Is in course of negotiation between an
existing firm and a stranger, and the firm propose to put in the old stock
at a certain price, the maxim "caveat emptor" applies. Uh~er v. Semple, 3.
14. One pdrtner has a lien upon the partnership effects for moneys
advanced by him beyond his share of the capital. Id.
15. He has no such lien for money advanced to or lent to an individual
partner. Id.
15. A simple agreement by a firm, to employ one at wages to be mea-
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sured by a sroportion of the profits, does not oonstitute him a partnet
.McMahon Y. O'Donnell, 390. -
17. The interest of one partner in the firm property is not subject to
levy and sale under an attachment. Patterson v )nsumbull, 644.
18. One partner cannot plead usury to the contract of another, so as to
defeat a creditor's right to principal and legal interest. Dillon v. MoRae,
19. It requires a formal division, or a formal settlement of affiars, to put
two joint croppers in possession, each, of his own share. Uery v. BRin-
water, W4.
20. The Act of Congress of March 19,1862, does not prohibit a partnership
between a sutler and any other person, except an army officer. Wolcot v.
Gibson, 64.
21. Where one pirtner is liable to his co-partner for a portion of the
partnership funds.the form of action is for money had and received.
Rainsford v. Rainsford, 718.
PATENT.
1. Itis the duty of the Commissioner of Patents, upon being satisfied of
having made a mistake, in supposing that prior inventioni would be cov-
ered if the claim was made broader than the applicant makes it, to grant
a reissue with a broader claim. Morey v. Lockwoo, 126.
2. The assignment of a patent must be in writing. Davy v. Morgan, 6(5.
PAYMENT. See DxsToxA mn axTo, 3.
L A cheek or promissory note, either of the debtor or a third person,
received for a debt. is notpayment if not itselfpsid, except in cases where
it is positively agreed to be received as payment. Mv eehoIders of .Mdde-
=e v. 27omas, 820.
2. Acceiting a check or draft implies an undertaking of due diligence in
presenting it for payment. Id.
?H!SICIAN. See AcTIow, 5.
PLATFORM. See XAmuoAD, 3.
PLEADING. Bee Coxxox CA ni-, 8; INTExwATiONAL LAW, 3.
1. An averment that the defendant is a foreign corporation, formed
under and created by the laws of the State of New .York, is a sufficient
averment that the defendant is a citizen of New York. buntze Bros v.
Erpress Cb., 200.
2. In a suit for damages, an allegation that the act was done carelessly
ant negligently is sufficient. McPheeters v. lan. & M. Jos. B. a. 325.
. Judgment on an indictment containing several counts will not.be
arrested if there is one good count in the indictment. Glines v. Smih,
58.
4. In a civil suit where there are several counts, on each of which dam.
ages are claimed, judgment must be arrested on a general verdict, if one
count is bad. I-d.
5. Where a note was alleged to have been endorsed by Sturges & Co., and
the evidence showed it to be Sturges & Co., it was held, there was no vari-
ance. Keith v. Surges, 71&
PRACTICE. See Arios, 1; AuBiTnATroN, 2; MORTGAG, .
1. If the answer of a witness to an illegal question worlds the objecting
party no injury, it is not an error of which a revising court can take
notice. Nailar v. WilUams, 61.
2. Where there is nothing In the bill of exceptions which enables a re-
vising eck irtto say that questions objected to hive exceededthereasonable
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a-ccnse which a court, in its discretion, may allow in cross-examination,
no error is shown. Id.
8. An objection to the right to maintain an action must be raised at the
trial, but otherwise of an objection to the uncoastitutionalityof an act of
the legislature. .Brookman v. Hamil, 190.
4. The fact that no transcript of the record was filed at the next term to
that when a decree appealed from was made, is, in general, fatal to the
appeal. The Lucy, 200.
5. The law provides but two modes of correcting errors in legal proceed-
ings, by motion, and by appeal. Libby v. Boselerans, 324.
6. Special matters maybe given in evidence under a general plea, with-
out notice, where no notice is required by rule of court, and no demand for
It is made beforehand by the opposite party. Angler v. Angier, 335.
7. Taws of other States must be proved. Mazer v. Semple, 390.
8. The 4th section of the Act of March 5th, 1865, establishes the mode in
which parties may submit cases to the court without a jury, and the man-
ner in which a review of the law of such cases may be had in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Norris v. Jackson, 421.
9. The special finding of the facts mentioned in the statuteis not a mere
report of the evidence, but a finding of those ultimate facts on which the
law must determine the rights of the parties. Id.
10. If the finding of facts be general, only such rulings of the court, in the
progress of the trial, can be reversed, as are presentedby a bill of exception.
Id.
U. In such cases a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole
testimony for review, any more than in a trial by jury. Id.
12. Objections totheadmission orrejection of evidence, orto such rulings
or propositions of law as may be submitted to the court must be shown
by bill of exceptions. Id.
13. If the parties desire a review of the law of the case, they must ask the
court to make a special finding which raises the question, or get the court
to rule on the legal propositions which they present. Id.
14. After respondent has appeared generally on an appeal, it is too late
to object to the appeal for want ofa stamp. Cbppernallv. Ketcham, 518.
15. A verdict will be set aside, if the judge sends the jury minutes of the
'strongest evidence" on one side only, on a material point. Glines v.
Smith, 518.
16. To avoid the statute of limitations the issuing of the writ is the com-
mencement of the action; for other purposes the service of the writ is so
regarded. .Erbyv. Tackson, 574.
17. Notice of discontinuance of a former suit, before service of summons
in second suit, will prevent the former abating the latter. Id.
18. A party sued by a wrong name, who is served with the writ and fails
to plead in abatement, is concluded by a judgment. -aUerson v. . C..
B., 581.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See ErIs A2D NoTxs.
QUO WARRANTO.
L An information In the nature of a writ of quo warranto is essentially a
civil proceeding. State e rel. .Bornefeld v. .Repferle, 196.
2. The acts of a private corporation are to be presumed regular until the
contrary appears. Id.
RAILROAD. See CoRPoRmTroN, 4; FEcxa, 2; NmZGLGeNO.
L There exists a common law duty on the part of railway companies to
provide reasonable accommodations at their stations for ,passengers who
are invited and expected to travel on their roads. McDonald et uz. v. The
Chicago & N. W. B, 10.
2. Railroad companies are held to a strict accountability for the safety
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of P"sengers. To enable them to properly discharge this duty, they have
power to make reasonable rules and regulations respecting the time,
mode, and place of entering cars; and these, When known to aepasenger,
he is bound to conform to, and he cannot violate them bypursuinganother
course and hold the company liable-for damages thus occasioned, though
the jury may believe that an ordinarily prudent man might have adopted
the same course. Id.
3. As ageneral rule, railroad companies are bound to keep In a safe con-
dition all portions of their platforms and approaches thereto, to which
the public do or would naturally resort, and all portions of their station
grounds reasonably nearthe platforms, where passengers or those who
have purchased tickets with a view to take passage on their cars, would
naturally or ordinarily be likely to go. d.
4. Where an injury occurred at a street crossing, norecovery can be had
without proof of actual negligence. McPheeters v. Han. & J-os. B,.AL, 3-25.
& A railroad company is liable for injuries restlting fromi the malicious
removal from the cars o one who got on wrongfully. RUne v. P. .ARLi
Lb., 3-27.
6. A conductor may use force to prevent one from wrongfully getting on
the cars. Id.
7. The rule that the plaintiff cannot recover damages if his own wrong,
as well as that of the defendant, conduced to the injury, is confined to
cases where the plaintiff's wrong or neglinence has immediately or proxi-
mately contributed to the result. Id.
8. A railroad company Is liable for injuries resulting from its servants
fasely announcing the arrival of the trainat a station. a & . Centraz B.
B. v. 1Trrell, 45L
9. A railroad company Is not liable to an individual for rendering a high-
way impassible by the construction of the railway. Buck v. C. k. P.. B.
Co., 579.
10. Where a passenger at a railroad depot. while having his baggage
checked, got into an altercation with the baggage master and was struck
by him with a hatchet, the company were not liable for the injury. Litle
Arutan B. a. v. Wetmore, 621.
11. Railroad company not liable for baggage, not called for within twen-
ty-four hours after its arrival at destination, Holdridge v. U. ,k B.a B..,
W3.
12. In Vermont the obligation of railroad comlanies tobuild fences along
their roads only extends to the rightful owner of adjoining fields. Bemis
v. . & P. AR.B Co., 645.
13. A railroad company is only bound to use ordinary care and diligence
to avoid injury to the owner of an animal tresspassing on their track. Id.
14. NUNIcIPAL SUBSCRIPTIONS AND TAXATION IN AID OF RAILROADS, 649.
15. Where the Maine Central Railroad Company let to the Eastern Ex-
press Company, for four years, the exclusive use of a certain separate
apartment in a car attached to each of their passenger trains, for the pur-
pose of transporting the express company's messenger and merchandise,
and agreed that they would not, during the continuance of such contract,
let any space in any car on their passenger trains to any other express
carrier; and the railroad company, before the expiration of such contract,
but after reasonable notice to them, refused to receive upon any terms
from the New England Express Company when and where they received
the Eastern Express Company's freight, such packages as are usually car-
ried by express companies, to be transported by their passenger trains-
Red, that the railroad company were liable, under c. 193 of the Public
Laws of 1868, to the New England Express Company, in an action of dam-
ages. Ekzpress Cb. v. Maine Ceral P., 728.
16. It seems that an action at common law would lie against the railroad
ander the same circumstances. Id.
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REBELLION. See CownrATz STATzS; IwTzzrATiomlAL LAw; LuarATiOrs,
10; TRnwAsS, 18, 20.
AMCEIPT.
A written reoelpt is not conclusive. .Freeholder v. 7owmas, 320.
RECEIVER. See FAuTrtzusHiP, 10.
1. The receiver of a corporation duly appointed and qualified, is the
trustee of all tho creditors. Libby v. Rosekcrans, 319.
2. It is no ground for setting aside a sale made by a receiver, that the
creditor obtaining the order was a justice of the court granting it. 1d.
3. An order directing a receiver of a corporation how to sell real estate
cannot be quesdoned by a stockholder in a collateral action, Libby v:
Bosekrans, 32U.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See CouRTs.
RENT. See L DLonD AD TENANT.
REPLEVIN.
1. The return upon a replevin writ should state precisely what property
is thereby replevied; if it does not, the sureties on the replevin bond are
not liable to return what was not taken. iller v. Moses, 127.
2. A surety on a replevin bond is not estopped by the recitals therein to
show how much the property mentionedinthe writ was actually replevied,
when the officer's return is indefinite in this particular. Id.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See STRRAM.
1. As between proprietors of dams on the same stream, he has the better
right who was first in point of time. Lincoln v. C7hardbourne, 125.
2. The line of the riparian owner of land in Illinois, bounded by the Ohio
river, extends at least to low water mark. Emninger v..People, 128.
8. The riparian owner, thus having the title to the land between the
high and low water mark, and the right to tile exclusive use thereof, has
the right to establish a private wharf thereon, and make reasonable char-
ges for its use by those navigating the river. Id.
4. A person navigating a river cannot land against the wil of the ripa-
rian owner, and becomes a trespasser if he does. Id.
SALE.
A tax sale is not ajadicAl sale. .Bety v. Mason, 582.
SAVING INSTITUTION, See BAWK.
SET-OFF.
1. In a suit by an insolvent bank against an indorser, the latter may set-
off notes of the bank held by him at the time of the insolvency, but not
those purchased'since. American Bank v. Wall, 120.
2. A debt due to one of several joint debtors may be offset to the claim.
.fortland v. Holton, 193.
3. In a suit by A v. B, B eannot file In offset a judgment recovered by
M against A and assigned to B. before the commencement of A's suit.
Rowe v. Langley, 518.
4. An unliquidated and uncertain claim for damages is not a subject of
set-of. Smith v. Washington Gas Light Company, 581.
SHERIFF. See BANNRUrTCY 13, 14.
1. Lawful money cannot be held derelict in the hands of a deputy sheriff
into whose possession it came by virtue of a search warrant. Xortonv.Nye,
12.
2. The refusal of the deputy to pay over money thus obtained, to one en-
titled to receive it, on demand, is a misfeasance for which the sheriff in
liable. Id.
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. The obligor on a bond of indemnity is liable to the sheriff as well as
to the person claiming the property. Stewart v. Thomas, 327.
4. The obligor may make any defense, when sued by the sheriff, that the
latter could have made in the original suit on his official bond. Id.
5. Irregularities in a sale made by a sheriff are only cognizable in the
court from whence the execution issued. Wison v. Ailer, 446.
$IPP1rNG. See VEsszr, 3.
. The explosion or a boiler on a steam vessel Is not a "peril of naviga-
tion" within the term as used in the exception in bills of lading. Yropel-
ler Mlohawl12.
2. Goods laden on deck and jettisoned do not make a case for general
average. Bay v. Schooner Belle, 311.
S. Forty tons of pig lead were shipped on the deck of a schooner with
consent of the shipper, who took a bill of lading with t, dangers of naviga-
tion excepted." Part of the lead was properly thrown overboard for re-
lief of the vessel in a storm: Held, the vessel is not liable to contribute for
the loss. Id.
4. The fact that the shipment of the lead on deck was sought by the mas-
ter for the purpose of trimming a vessel, held not to be material. Id.
5. Under the Act of Congress of February, 1845, liens created by State
laws on vessels navigating the western lakes and rivers, were treated as
quasi maritime liens; but since the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, they can no longer be regarded as
of that character. MallerofDwighl Scott, 349.
6. Mortgages of vessels, duly recorded as required by the act of 1850, are
entitled to preference over liens under the water-craft laws of Ohio, for
supplies, etc., furnished subsequently to the recording of the mortgage.
Id.
7. The master of the vessel is bound to carry the goods shipped on her to
their place of destination in his own ship; unless he is prevented from so
doing by the act of God, the public enemy, the act of the shipper, or by
some one of the perils excepted inthe contract of shipment. The Maggie
Hammond, 440.
8. A captain entering a port at night and in a fog enters at his own peril,
unless there is some necessity for it. The -Portsmouwh, 441.
9. Jettison resorted to in consequence of want of prudence, is not a loss
by dangers of navigation. Id.
10. The stranding of a vessel is voluntary, and as such the subject of
general average, whenever the will of man contributed thereto. Star of
Rope, 455.
11. As a general rule, the contributory value of a ship is her value at the
time of her arrival at the termination of the voyage. Id.
12. The master may sell a portion of the cargo to make repairs. Id.
13. The law creates no maritime lien on a vessel as security for the per-
formance of a contract to transport a cargo, unless some contract of af-
freighment has been made. The Keokuk, 574.
SLAVE. See EQurrY, 4.
1. A bond given for the price of a slave sold in 1859 is valid. West v.
Hall, 390.
2. A bond given for the hire of a slave for 1865, on January 2d, 1865. is
subject to be scaled. 2fazwellv. R p, 390.
ieCIFIC PERFORMANCE. See CoN~nAcT, 3.
L In general, time is not of the essence of a contract to sell land, but it
may be made so either by the contract itself or by the nature of the sub.
ject-matter, or by express notice requiring the contract to be fulfilled or
rescinded within a reasonable time stated. Ruckman v. King.
2. Parol evidence is admissible to show that, at the making of the con-
tract, time was considered of the essence of it. Id.
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3. A stipulation to convey on receiving certainpaymentsand mortgages
"at the time and in the manner mentioned," is not sufficient in itself to
make time of the essence of the contract, but under the circumstances of
this case they are held sufficient. Id.
4. A contract to convey lands described, "and also two lots of land
situate in Hackensack township," at a specified price per acre for the
whole, is too uncertain to enable a court of equity to decree specific per-
formance. Id.
5. Specific performance of a contract to sell land cannot be decree
unless the contract identifies the land, or furnishes the means of so doing
M Guire v. Stvens, 48.
6. Under the statute of frauds, parol evidence Is not admissible to sup-
ply the want of suchidentification of the land Inthe written contract. Id
7. Parol evidence of what parties to a written contract intended to
express, is not admissible. Where parol evidence is received at all to er
plain written instruments, it s to explain what was really expressed. Id
& A bill In equity to enforce a parol coftract for the sale of land cax-
not be maintained n Mississippi, and part performance will not take ,
parol sale of lands out of the statute of frauds. Id.
9. A parol gift of land will be equally protected with a parol sale, if
accompanied by possession. 2ale v. Nealesa 51.
STAMP. See CosrlTuToNA- LAw, 14; PaAOTIoE, 14; VYn=O A"D PURCHAs,
25.
1. The waiver of demand and notice of non-payment written on a note
requires no stamp. 1Factflc Bank v. De Do, 327.
L The Act of Congress requiring stamps, on instruments not properly
stamped, to be affixed by the collector, does not apply to the process of
courts of record. Cbppernoll v. Ketcham, 518.
3. An agreement unstamped and not offered to be stamped is nvalid
andproperly excluded as evidence. Davy v. Morgan, 64.
STATUTES, See MA2MAMUS, 1.-
Revenue and duty acts, notbelng penaltard not to beconstrued strictly.
avy v. 2forgan, 647.
STOCK. See BRoKER, 2.
STREET. See HIGHIWAY, 5; MuNIcPAL CoRPORoTION, 7; BAILROA.D, 4.
STREAM. See RBunrAN Owaa.
No one has the right to pollute or corrupt the waters of a creek, or if
they are already partially polluted, to render them more so. Alt whose
lands border on a stream have the right to have its waters come to them
pure and unpolluted. Attorney General v. Steward, 387.
SURETY. See ATTonyr, 2; BANr, 9; BAwxaupur, 16.
Where A becomes surety for the faithful discharge of B's duties'as
cashier, the obligation continues so long as B holds the office by virtue oS
the appointment under which the bond is given. Though the office be
usually treated as elective for one year only, yet the surety will be liable
for B's acts if B continue in office after the year. But on B's re-election
and qualification for a second term, the liability on the old bond ceases.
Rparkt v. Farmers' Bank, 365.
TAXATION. See BAn., 4,5; CoNsTrr ozrA Lw,4, 19,28, 2 28; nExnaT
DoxaiL; SALz.
L It is the general policy of the law to avoid double taxation and this
consideration is of weight in determining the construction of statutes im.
posing it; but where their meaning is clear the courts cannot hold suci
taxation illegal. bll-bridge v. Osborn, 73.
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2. A corporation was chartered in 1796 to build and maintain a toll.
bridge, with power "for the purpose of carrying the resolve into effect.'
to purchase and hold lands not exceeding one hundred acres. The com-
pany built the bridge, and soon after purchased a large quantity of mud
flat adjoining the bridge, and erected wharves upon a portion of it, which
became of great value and were profitably rented. An Act passed in 1847
Drovided that the real estate of any private corporation, "above what was
iequired and uied for the transaction of its appropriate business," should
be liable to be assessed and taxed to the same extent as if owned by an
individual: Held, that the real estate thus used by the company for
wharves was liable to taxation under the statute. Id.
8. Such a use of the real estate which the company was authorized to
purchase and hold was not contemplated or authorized by its charter. Id.
4. And the question, as to what rights the companymight have acquired
by prescription-did not properly arise, inasmuch as the charter, on which
the company itself relied, showed clearly what was its appropriate busi.
ness, and this was the sole question in determining the liability of the pro.
petty to taxation. Id.
5. The charter provided that the bridge and all property owned by the
company appurtenant thereto should be considered personal estate and
divided into shares: Held, that this provision related to the property of
the stockholders as represented by the shares, and not to the property of
the corporation itselfin its relation to otherparties,andthat the property
in question was therefore taxable as real estate. Id.
6. A tax for a private purpose is unconstitutional, and a statute imnposing
it is void. A public use or purpose is essential to the idea of a tax. Wi-
imgv. Slheboygcn B. B. Cb.. 156.
7. The rights of taxation and of eminent domain are separate and distinct
rights, and the public wre sufficient to support legislation for one purpose,
Isnot necessarily sufficient to support it for the other. id.
8. The public use, which justifies the exercise of eminent domain con-
sists in the possession and enjoyment of the land itself by the public or
public agencies, and not in the mere incidental advantages that may accrue
to the public from the enterprise. Id.
9. The possession by the public, which constitutes the public use, in the
case of railroads and similar corporations, in whose favor the right of emi-
nent djmain has been exercised, consists in the fact that the corporation
must perform its duties for the public on tender of the proper compensa.
tion, and the fact that the State retains the right to control the franchise
and limit the tolls to be charged. Id.
10. But such a qualified and limited public use will not support taxation
for the sole and direct benefit of the corporation. Ld.
14. Therefore, a statute levying a tax for the sole purpose of making a
direct gift of the money raised, to a mere private railway in which the
State or the tax-payers have no ownership, is unconstitutional. Id-
12. The right of the States to tax the shares of the national banks reat-
firmed. National Bank v Commonwealth, 52.
1. This is true, although the tax is collected of the bank instead of the
individual stockholders. Id.
14. It is a fundamental principle in the law of taxation that taxes must
be laid for apublic and not a mere private purpose. 2T People v. Town-
ship Board, 487.
15. A statute authorizing the levy and collection of a tax to aid railway
companies in the construction of their roads violates this fundamental •
principle and is void. Id.
16. A statute which undertakes to confer upon a majority of the voters
of a township authority to votea tax, the proceeds of which are to be given
to railway corporations to aid in the construction of roads to run through
the township, is not an enactment authorized by the taxing power of tb4L
State. d.
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17. The nature and extent of the txing power, and the limitations upon
It, discussed by Coozr, J. Id.
18. Where an officer has power to assess generally, and the duty of de-
termining what is within it Is imposed upon him, if the thing assessed Is
in its nature in any circumstances capable of being brought within the
law, an erroneous decision in this regard does not render the proceeding
void. Pullan v. Kinslnger, 557.
19. The 19th section of the Act of July, 1886, as amended In 1867, provid-
ing that no suit shall be maintained to restrain the collection of a tax, ap-
plies to all cases where the proceedings are not nutlUies, however errone-
ous or Irregular. Id.
20. The constitutional provisions securing 
"
trial by jury," and "due
process of law," do not apply to proceedings for fhe assessment and col-
lection of publicrevenue, orthe exercise bygovernment of political rightso
rd.
21. In the absence of legislation on the subject, a corporation will not
be exempted from State taxation, merely because It is employed by the
United States. Thompson v. Pacific R. 2?., 576.
22. The legislature of Illinois cannot delegate the power to impose cor-
porate taxation to any authority, other than tfle corporate authorities of
cities. People ez rel. v. Mayor of Chicago, 642.
23. The legislature of Illinois has power to create special taxation dis-
trlcts for municipal purposes. People ez rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 643.
24. Several towns may be united in one district, for the special purpose
of establishing and maintalnihg a public park. rd.
25. Under the Constitution of Illinois the right of taxation cannot be
granted either to private persons or private corporations. .arward v.
a Clair Drainage Co., 712.
26. "Corporate authorities" in the Constitution, means those municipal
omcers who are elected by the people sought to be taxed. Id.
TELEGRAPHL See Evwzxcz, 9.
TENANT IN COMMON.
L Occupying property cannot be held liable to his co-tenants for use
and occupation. Israel v. Israel, 328.
2. Will only be allowed for expenses incurred in the preservation of the
property. Id.
TIMBER. See DAx.AOes, 5; FRAUDs, STA'rzr Op, 5; TnxsPAss, 9,19.,
TIME. See EQUITY, 3; SPEciviO PEnFoaxAxr , 1, 2, 3.
Whtn any matter of proceeding or practice is required by statute or
rule of court to be within a certain number of days, the first day, or termi-
nus a quo is excluded. 2Torns v. Mosher, 390.
TITLE. See VzsoDR AnD Pua.sy, 26.
1. There can be no constructive possession of land without colorof title.
Wells v. Jakson Iron Cb., 520.
2. An entry on part of a lot with color of title, gives constructive pos-
session of the entire lot. Id.
TOWN. SEE MUNICIPA&L CORPORATION, 5,
TRESPASS. See*IxNmucvioN, 3.
1. The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser, or one who comes
on it by mere sufferance, for negligence, even though the act complained
of would be a nuisance in a public highway. Cbz v. phrmer'ls farket Co.
103.
2. It is the duty of every person to take care of his own safety, and one
who ventures along a private passage-way at night does so at his own
risk. IdL
S. Between two market-houses there was a space of thirty feet wide,
82.
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running from one street to another. The space was paved both as a foot
and cartway, and formed an open passage-way from street to street, , hich
the public were in the habit of using, though both it end the market
houses were private property. HeZd, that the passage was not a public
highway. Id.
4. The purpose of the company in leaving open and paving the space
being plainly to accommodate customers resorting to the market-houses.
its acquiescence in the general use of the passage-way by the public was
not a dedication to public use. Id.
5. A person going along this passage-way at night, after market hours,
fell down the steps of a basement opening on the passage-way. Held, that
the company were not liable for his injuries. rd.
6. Equity will not enjoin a trespass merely because the defendant is pe-
cuniarily unable to respond in damages. 2forgan v. .Prmer, 519.
7. In trespass for killing sheep, the accused is not entitled to have the
case proved beyond a reasonable doubt. BurneU v. Word, 579.
. Military officers may take private property for public use without
making themselves trespassers. Bryan v. Walker, 583
9. In trespass for cutting timber off vacant land, plaintiff must show
good title. Ifining Cb. v. Irby, 583.
10. Section 4, Article 11, of the Constitution of the State of Missouri,
which in substance exempts persous from liability for acts done duringthe
recent civil war, byvirtueof military authority vested in them by the gov.
ernment of the United States, or in pursuance of an order received from
any person vested with such authority, is valid and protects from prose-
cution or action, all who can show for their acts the authorization of a
military officer, acting under the commander-in-chief of the army of the
United States. Mark v. Dick, 739.
31. Where, in an action of trespass, the defendant pleaded, in substance,
that civil war existed, that martial law was in force, and that the alleged
trespasses were compulsory assessments, made upon the plaintiff or his
property, by virtue of an order of the commanding general of the army in
that department: Hetd, That the facts pleaded brought the case within
the above-mentioned section of the constitution of the State, under which
they were a good defense to the action. Id.
12. That provision of the Constitution is not void because of its retro-
spective operation nor because other provisions of the Constitution may
prohibit the legislature from passing retro-active statutes. Id.
13. Nor does it conflietwith the national Constitution limiting the power
of the States; nor is it rendered invalid by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, as that is a limitation on the powers of the general govern-
ment, and not on those of the States. Id.
14. Thefaets above mentioned, pleaded as a defense to the action, bring
the case within the two-year's limitation clause of the Act of Congress of
1863 (12 Stats. at Large, 757), and this limitation is applicable to a case
originating in a Sate court, and by virtue thereof properly removed into
the Federal court. Id.
15. In an actioni of trespass, the defendant, under a plea of not guilty,
may show that the actscomplained of were not unlawful. Smith.v. Brazle.
ton, 762.
16. In an action of trespass for leading or inducing confederate soldiers
to cut down and burn plaintiffs fences, timber, etc., during the late war,
the facts that the defendant was a sympathizerwith the confederate cause,
that he was seen to ride with confederate officers across his own land and
point to land of plaintiff, and that timber, etc., was cut by the confederate
soldiers of plaintiff's land but not off defendant's, is too uncertain and
remote to support a verdict for damages. Id.
17. It seemr that in such a case the political opinions of the parties may
tse given in evidence as a part of a chain of circumstances tending to show
defendant's connection with the trespass. Id.
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18. The late civil war was a pub ic oar and there was no difference in the
rights of the parties; each had all the rights of an independent belligerent.
Ia.
19. Among such rights is that of cutting down timber, etc., for the use
of the army, and, therefore, the pointing out of another's land or advising
the cutting of his timber, does not make the party doing so liable to an as-
tion of trespass. d.
20. The case of Yo v. &mut 4 Cold. 205; Davison v. Manlove, 2 Cold. 347;
Wood v. Sone, 2 Cold 370, and WrigtU v. OveraU, 2 Cold. 836, overruled or
modified.
TROVER. See BAmUzTOy, 13.
L Refusal to permit the owner to take certain logs off defendant's land,
and subsequent sale of part, is a conversion of the whole by defendant.
Sherman v. Way, 647.
2. May he maintained by a naked ballee, and also by a pledge for value.
Huton v Arnett, 776.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See LnrITATiONS, 7.
L In New York a trustee holding funds for investment for the benefltof
minor children must invest in government or real estate securities ; any
other investment makes the trustee liable. .Elng v. ThlboI 62.
2. An agreement to purchase lands and take the legal title thereto, for
the purpose of speoulation, and to sell the same withinftveyears, andafter
deducting the outlay and interest and taxes pay over one half of the pro-
ceeds to one who was to furnish his time and judgment in selecting the
lands, renders the holder of the title a trustee. Seymour v. .Freer, 198.
3. The trustee willxontinue after the expiration of the five years. I&
4. An express trust may dipend for its operation upon a future event
-- and is then a contingent trust. Ardis..Printup, 542.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See CouxTs; Eano ans ArPrXAS, 4,5,6; Lnxi-
TATrIOms, 14; MAaDAmus, 6, 10.
USURY. See MoTGAG, 5. PATra nsir, 18.
L A debt in good faith contracted in another State cannotbe impeached
in Massachusetts for usury. l er v. mple, 390.
2. Stipulation by the creditor for the payment of the legal rate of inter-
est in the State where the debtor resides and the note is made is not
usury. Housox v. Pos, 456. #
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See ATTAcnxw!T, 2; SrOIcrIO Pzroax0Ae.
L Of Real Mtate.
L Under the recording acts of Illinois, In order to defeat a subsequent
purchaser for value of an unrecorded title, he must have notice of a previ
ous conveyance, or of some fact to puta prudent man on inquiry. Wal v
Smith, 59.
2. A purchaser at a collector's sale, is bound to see that the sale is in con-
formity with the law authorizing It. HamUton v. Mllant, 32.
3. A. collector's deed purporting to convey "all the right, title and es-
tate" of the State, passes no title to the purchaser. Einstein v. Gay, 328.
4 A vendor who has taken the notes of the vendee and given bond to
make title on the payment of the purchase-money, may, by an assignment
of the notes, pass his lien for the purchase-money, and the assignee may
proceed in equity to subject the land to the payment of his debt. Robin.
son v. Harbour, 35.
5. Covenants by vendor and vendee are to be construed as dependent or
Independent, according to the intention of the parties; and in ascertain
lng the intention, the court lays down the following rules:
6. a. Ifa day be appointed for payment of money, or part of it, or for
doing any other act. and the day is to happen or may happen before the
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thing which is the consideration of the money, or other act is to be ve
formed, an action may be brought for the money, or for not doing auch
other act, before performance ; for it appears that the parties relied upon
his remedy, and did not intend to make the performance a oondition pre.
cedent; and so it is where no time Is Axed for performance of that which
is the consideration of the money or the other act. Id.
7. b. But when a day is appointed for the payment of money, or for do-
ing any other act, and the day is to happen after the thing which is the
consideration of the money or other act Is to be performed, no action can
be maintained for the money, etc., before performance. Id.
8. a. Where a covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both
sides, and a breach of such covenant may be compensated in damages. it
is an independent covenant, and an action may be maintained for a breach
of the covenant on the part of the defendant, without averring perform-
ance in the declaration. Id.
9. . Where the acts of the parties are concurrent, and to be done or
performed at the same time, the covenants are dependent and neither
party can maintain an action against the other without averring aod
proving performance on his part. Id.
10. Where the vendee of land covenants to pay for the same by install-
ments, and the vendor covenants to make him a title within the last in-
stallment is paid, the covenants of the vendee to pay the installments, ex-
cept the last one, are independent covenants. But the covenant of the
vendee to pay the last installment, and the covenant of the vendor to
make title, are dependent covenants, and to entitle either of them to main.
tain an action against the other, he must aver and prove performance or
tender or offer of performance of his part ofthe agreement. Id.
11. After the execution of a contract of sale, the vendor beomes trus-
tee for the purchaser of the land, and the latter trustee of the purchse
money for the vendor, and any loss by fre falls on the vendee. Brewer v.
Herbert, 445.
12. .Primafade, a vendor's lien exists in all sales of real estate, for the
unpaid purchase-money. McGniga v..P ummer, 588.
13. The lien will be considered waived if an independent security is ta-
ken. Id.
14. When the land Is conveyed by deed, parol evidence is inadmissible to
prove * wartanty as to the quantity. Caboz v. C7risa 647.
15. A mutual and material mistake by the parties of the deed, as to the
quantity of land, is not a ground for relief at law, but in chancery. rd.
16. If the purchase of the land was induced by a false and fraudulent
representation as to the quantity of land, the grantee may austain an ac-
tion on the case against the grantor for the fraud. Id.
17. The vendor has a lien for unpaid purchase money against the vendee
and all parties claiming as volunteers or with notice, under him. Wi/son
i. Lyon, 719
18. Taking a policy of insurance on the life of vendee, where it is not ta-
ken as independent security, does not waive the lien. Id.
19. Where a grantee of lands takes a deed to the same, with notice of a
prior conveyance, not then recorded, he is not an innocent purchaser, but
takes subject to all the lights of the grantee under the prior conveyance.
Bay/le v. Young, 775.
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20. In sales of personal property, where the vender at the time has pos-
session, a warranty of the title is implied. Burt v. Dewey, 62
21. In an action by the vendor for the price of a chattel, sold on condi-
tion that the purchaser was to retur? it if he did not like it, where the
ohattle was retained an unreasonable time, it was held, there could be no
recovery if the vendor had subsequently dispensed with the return. Low
v. Pardee, 268.
22. The purchaser of a growing crop is not only entitled to a reasonable
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time after the crop matures to gather it, but to a reasonable time after
notice given by the vendor. Ogden v. Lucas, 391.
23. After notice to the vendor that articles warranted are inferior in
quality, the purchaser may sell and recover from vendor any loss sustained
on such sale. GOiford v. Betts, 391.
24 The vendor of goods -knowingly making falseyrepresentations as to
the quality is not liable, unless the buyer relies upon such representations.
Hagee v. Grossman, 4N.
25. A purchaser cannot be compelled to carry out a contract of sale in
writing, which is invalid for want of a stamp, because the contract would
have been valid by paroL Davy v. Morgan, 638.
26. The title to property, sold to be delivered upon payment of purchase
money, vests in the vendee upon tender of the price. Philips v. Witliams,
646.
VESSEL. See ADmRALTY, 8; SaIPPiNo.
1. A steam vessel entering a narrow channel is bound to keep at such
speed as to be entirely under control. The AUegheny, 441.
2. In crowded waters steam vessels are to be managed with extreme
caution. The Johnson, 441.
3. Where avessel is libeled and sold on a bottomry bond, the fund in
court is not subject, as against the bondholder, to any claim for a general
average loss subsequent to the date of the bond. Oologaard v. Brig Anna,
475.
4. It is the duty of a vessel undertaking to tow others to see that the
tow is properly made up. 27Te Quickstep, 50&
WAR. See CONFLDERATE STATES, 21; INTERNATIoNAL L&w, 1; TREsPAss, 8 10, 18.
1. Intercourse between debtor and creditor who are enemies is unlawful
during war. United States v. Grossnayer, 516.
2. A transaction originally unlawful cannot be made lawful by ratifica.
tion. Id.
WARRANTY. See VsNvoR As PuRcHASEA, 14, 20.
WATER-CRAFT LAWS. See ADmIALTY, 3; SEaprix, 5.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See EAsmmxT, 1; RrrPnrAx OWN=;
STREAM.
Equity will interpose, by mandatory injunction, to compel the restora-
tion of running water to its natural channel, when wrongfully diverted,
at the suit of the party whose lands include either the whole or a part of
such channel. Clbrntng et al. v. 2Troy Iron and Nail Ilactory, 63.
WAY. See Eisamr, 2, .
WHARF. See RrrAux Ow'zn, S.
1 ITNESS.
I. The Act of July 2, 164, making parties witnesses in their own suits,
applies to cases in which the United States is a party. Green v. United
States, 456.
2. Witness, whose testimony is impeached by witness who testifies that
be made a different statement out of court, may be recalled and asked.it
he did. Glines v. S nith, 51.
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